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Afghanistan on a Global Stage: The End of Armed
Conflict and Congress’s Constitutional Powers
Emmie Phillips*
On August 15, 2021, the Taliban took control of Kabul, ending their
weeks-long takeover of Afghanistan. Distraught by the quick offensive,
United States forces and their allies quickly secured the Kabul airport
and were forced to accelerate their planned withdrawal from the country
in a makeshift manner. Afghan civilians, particularly those who had supported the efforts of U.S. forces, desperately attempted to get out of the
country. The chaotic and disorganized withdrawal was not well received,
both in the United States and internationally.
Prior to the Taliban takeover, President Joe Biden had ordered the
U.S. withdrawal, with an expected end date of September 11, 2021. Congress had been left out of the withdrawal decision-making process.
Since the mid-twentieth century, and particularly after the September
11 terrorist attacks, congressional war- and treaty-making powers have
dwindled substantially. This is due not only to executive expansion over
the course of many wars, but also due to Congress’s willingness to abdicate its power.
The chaotic withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan uncovered
many issues in the executive branch’s extensive war and treaty powers.
It highlighted that the president can now launch offensives and define the
scope of armed conflict without any guidance from Congress, in direct
defiance of the Constitution.
In the past century, the United States has involved itself in many conflicts around the world. Increasingly, the decisions to start and stop these
conflicts have been concentrated in the hands of the president alone. This
has often led to devastating effects and is contrary to checks and balances
under the Constitution. Congress should reassert its constitutional war
and treaty powers and eliminate the unconstitutional, unilateral decisionmaking of the executive branch that has increasingly led to situations like
the withdrawal from Afghanistan.
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2023, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Thank you to the
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for its support. My thanks especially to Hannah May and
Sara Hoult for their assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Constitution makes clear that the executive and legislative
branches share war powers, in keeping with the spirit of democratic
checks and balances.1 The president is the commander in chief of the
armed forces,2 while Congress has the power to regulate and maintain
these forces.3 The Constitution demands cooperation between the
branches, ensuring the president’s power to direct the military does not
usurp the civilian right to govern it.4 But the president’s power to conduct
1. U.S. CONST. art. I; id. art. II.
2. Id. art. II, § 2 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the
United States . . . .”).
3. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11–14 (“[Congress has the power] [t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies . . .; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
the land and naval Forces; . . . .”).
4. Id.; see also John C. Dehn, The Commander-in-Chief and the Necessities of War: A Conceptual Framework, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 599, 608 (2011) (explaining one reason for the constitutional
arrangement was to prevent executive misuse of military in both domestic and international affairs);
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war operations expanded profoundly in the mid-twentieth century, beginning under President Truman’s direction during the conflict in Korea.5
Post-9/11, this power expanded even further, partially due to Congress’s
own role in abdicating its war powers to the Bush administration.6 At the
center of the debate surrounding executive war powers is whether the
president can authorize military use absent a declaration of war from
Congress.7
Treaty powers are no less muddy. The president may make treaties
with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate.8 The House of
Representatives is not involved in the treaty-making process.9 More recently, however, presidents have started using “executive agreements,”
which become effective when signed by the president and the head of the
foreign nation with which the agreement is conducted.10 There are two
types of executive agreements: (1) sole-executive agreements and (2)
congressional-executive agreements.11 Sole agreements are very rare and
THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, at 40 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Warner ed., 1818) (“It is of the
nature of war to increase the executive, at the expense of the legislative authority.”).
5. See Louis Fisher, Sidestepping Congress: Presidents Acting under the UN and NATO, 47
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1237, 1259 (1997) (noting that even with treaty and statutory safeguards,
President Truman sent U.S. troops to Korea in 1950 without congressional authorization); see also
Matthew Waxman, NATO and War Powers: Remembering the ‘Great Debate’ of the 1950s,
LAWFARE BLOG (July 11, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-and-war-powersremembering-great-debate-1950s [https://perma.cc/JJ3Z-S63G] (showing that in response to Truman’s deployment of troops to Korea, the Senate only passed a non-binding resolution that congressional authorization would be needed for future conflicts).
6. S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted), Authorization for Use of Military Force, 50
U.S.C. § 1541 [hereinafter AUMF]; see also The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct
Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them, 25 Op. O.L.C. 188, 188
(2001) (“Congress has acknowledged this inherent executive power [to use military force] in both
the War Powers Resolution . . . and in the Joint Resolution passed by Congress on September 14,
2001.”).
7. See Comm. on Int’l Sec. Affs. of Ass’n of Bar of City of N.Y., The Legality and Constitutionality of the President’s Authority to Initiate an Invasion of Iraq, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
15, 16 (2002) (explaining why President Bush needed congressional authorization to invade Iraq
in 2001); Graham T. Allison, Making War: The President and Congress, 40 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 86, 89 (1976) (arguing that going to war involved many national decision-making processes
on the deeper values and views of the president, Congress, and the country, while also considering
the merits of the potential conflict in question).
8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“[The president] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .”).
9. Id.
10. Distinguishing Treaties from Executive Agreements, GEO. UNIV. L. LIBR.,
https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=365734&p=3644814 (last updated Jan. 25, 2022, 12:45
PM) [https://perma.cc/DR5Z-C8LL]; see also The Use (and Abuse) of Executive Agreements,
BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 30, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-use-and-abuse-of-executive-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/7KC9-WUT7] (stating that executive agreements are usually
authorized through international relations).
11. The Use (and Abuse) of Executive Agreements, supra note 10; GLEN S. KRUTZ & JEFFREY
S. PEAKE, TREATY POLITICS AND THE RISE OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: INTERNATIONAL
COMMITMENTS IN A SYSTEM OF SHARED POWERS 30 (2009).
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can only be used pursuant to Article II powers.12 Still, Congress may attempt to invalidate sole-executive agreements through its legislative or
purse powers.13 Congressional agreements are more common and are
made either pursuant to a statutory grant of power to the president, or
with congressional approval from a majority of both houses.14 As presidents sought to work around the legislative branch by using executive
agreements, the trend of dwindling congressional power seeped into foreign relations and treaty powers.
The withdrawal from a twenty-year war in Afghanistan had significant
implications on American foreign policy, constitutional war powers, and
international law. Congress’s minimal involvement in the withdrawal decision highlights that the authority of the president in times of war has
grown substantially.
Congress should take initiative to reassert its constitutional war powers
alongside the executive branch in order to avoid future premature presidential actions regarding war and foreign policy. Additionally, Congress
should assert its constitutional responsibility to advise on and consent to
war-ending treaties and related executive agreements, playing a greater
logistical role and preventing impulsive exercises of executive authority
at war’s end.
This Comment primarily examines the trend of decreasing congressional war powers since the mid-twentieth century,15 and Congress’s allbut-disappearing powers in the days after 9/11 under the Authorization
for Use of Military Force (AUMF).16 Part II addresses the history of executive war powers leading up to the War Powers Resolution of 1973.
This Part examines the purpose and provisions of the Resolution that ultimately foreshadowed the issues we see today in Afghanistan. Finally,
this Part addresses the 9/11 terror attacks and the AUMF of 2001 that
12. A sole-executive agreement is an agreement between the president and the head of a foreign
nation that is not approved or ratified by the Senate under Article II treaty powers. The Use (and
Abuse) of Executive Agreements, supra note 10; see also Morris D. Forkosch, Treaties and Executive Agreements, 32 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 201, 214 (1954) (arguing that legislative delegation to the
president to create an executive agreement, or a “congressional-executive agreement,” is the most
accepted basis for its source of authority).
13. Forkosch, supra note 12, at 206, 209–10; see also CLARE LAKEWOOD, CTR. FOR
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, YES, HE CAN: PRESIDENT OBAMA’S POWER TO ENTER A LEGALLY
BINDING AGREEMENT WITHOUT WAITING FOR CONGRESS 3 (2009), https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/to_paris_and_beyond/pdfs/YesHeCanFactsheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/83US-TTXM] (“Congress could attempt to pass a statute invalidating a sole executive agreement after it is entered into. . . . It is possible that Congress may seek to block a budget
bill that appropriates funds . . . .”).
14. See Forkosch, supra note 12, at 216 (“[C]ompacts designated as ‘legislative’ executive
agreements, i.e., agreements made by the executive department but deriving their power from Congressional delegation, are probably the ones least known but those most frequently concluded.”).
15. See infra Part II (examining the trend of decreasing congressional war powers).
16. See infra Section II.C (discussing effect of the AUMF on Congress’s war powers).
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gave President Bush and his successors immense powers to act as they
saw fit against a broadly defined “terrorist” enemy.
Part III follows with an in-depth discussion of the War in Afghanistan,
beginning with a history of American intervention, the start of Operation
Enduring Freedom, and the final withdrawal process in 2021. It also examines constitutional war powers and treaty powers, with relevant Supreme Court case analysis.
Part IV looks to the past and the future. This Part argues that Afghanistan could have gone differently with a more robust congressional hand
in the withdrawal process, showing how expanded authority will hopefully prevent emotion-filled, politically motivated interventions and
hasty, uncoordinated withdrawals in the future.
Finally, Part V shows the actions, or lack of actions, that Congress has
recently taken to restore its war and treaty powers. Though Congress has
begun the process of reasserting its constitutional war powers, this Part
argues that more must be done under Congress’s treaty obligations.
II. HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE WAR POWERS
To begin, executive war powers have expanded broadly in the past
eighty years, with presidents seeking authority beyond Congress.17 Between the rise of multinational organizations like the United Nations
(UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the legislative branch’s willingness to abdicate power, Congress has practically
stripped itself of the essential powers to declare and regulate war.18 The
trend became unmistakable after 9/11, when Congress granted President
Bush the power to intervene throughout the world on behalf of “fighting
terror.”19
This section begins with a focus on mid-twentieth century and the initial expansion of the executive war-making power, including specific focus on how Truman was able to grant himself power through the UN and
NATO. Then, it looks at the War Powers Resolution, through which Congress first attempted to restore its dwindling constitutional responsibilities. Finally, it turns to the post-9/11 world and the immense presidential
undertaking to fight terror on a global scale, with a contextual focus on
the foreshadowing of Afghanistan.
17. See Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 123, 125 (1994) (“Now, it is the President [and not Congress] whose power has expanded and who therefore needs to be checked.”). See generally William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505 (2008);
Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996).
18. See generally Erin Peterson, Presidential Power Surges, HARV. L. TODAY (July 17, 2019),
https://today.law.harvard.edu/feature/presidential-power-surges/ [https://perma.cc/6HXG-NC2Q].
19. AUMF, supra note 6.
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A. Post-World War II War Powers
The expansion of executive war powers dates back to the Truman administration and America’s growing optimism in the ashes of World War
II about its role in neoliberalist, democracy-touting missions. One reporter stated that the executive role in armed conflict “developed into an
undefined power . . . to employ without [c]ongressional authorization the
armed forces in the protection of American rights and interests abroad
whenever necessary.”20
In 1950, Truman unilaterally deployed troops to the Korean peninsula
without congressional authorization.21 As Truman put it, he was simply
following unofficial orders from the UN Security Council, which had
“called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance
to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution [to uphold rule
of law in Korea].”22
1. The United Nations
The Senate first formally introduced the UN Charter in 1943.23 There
was extensive debate about how the United States would participate, with
members of Congress finally agreeing that it would be done “through [the
nation’s] constitutional processes.”24 Therefore, Congress’s war powers,
and the Senate’s treaty powers, would remain intact even in the international arena.25 The Connally Resolution provided that Congress, whether
through senatorial treaty or by a majority of each house voting on a joint
resolution, still had the power to prevent aggression in the international

20. Edward S. Corwin, Who Has the Power to Make War?, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1949, at 14.
21. See Andrew D. LeMar, War Powers: What Are They Good For?: Congressional Disapproval of the President’s Military Actions and the Merits of a Congressional Suit Against the President, 78 IND. L.J. 1045, 1049 (“Truman, singlehandedly involved the United States in the Korean
War without seeking Congress’s approval, beginning a ‘new era in the exercise of presidential
prerogative.’” (quoting Martin S. Sheffer, Does Absolute Power Corrupt Absolutely?, 24 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 233, 279 (1999))); see also Fisher, supra note 5, at 1259 (“[Truman] announced
that the UN Security Council had ordered North Korea to withdraw its invading forces . . . and that
‘in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council, the United States will vigorously support
the effort of the Council to terminate this serious breach of the peace.’” (quoting PUB. PAPERS 491
(1950))).
22. Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea, 173 PUB. PAPERS 492 (June 27, 1950).
23. Preparatory Years: UN Charter History, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/aboutus/history-of-the-un/preparatory-years (last visited Mar. 26, 2022) [https://perma.cc/RWK6UXE9]; Fisher, supra note 5, at 1242.
24. 89 CONG. REC. 7646–47 (1943); see Fisher, supra note 5, at 1256 (stating that it is obvious
from UN Charter’s creation as an international treaty—entered into by way of advice and consent
from the Senate—that a president would not be able to act unilaterally under the Charter).
25. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (delineating Senate’s role in treaty-making); see also Fisher,
supra note 5, at 1243 (“[A]ny commitment to join the United Nations, made either by agreement
or by treaty, ‘must go through in a constitutional way, either by a two-thirds vote of the Senate or
by the approval of the entire Congress.’” (quoting 89 CONG. REC. 7647 (1943))).
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community.26 But little consideration was given to the question of deploying troops in a UN action.27 Most senators agreed that American
troops could be used without congressional approval if they were deployed only as a “police force” to limit aggression, not in a full-scale
armed conflict.28
2. NATO
Created in 1949, the NATO alliance brought together the United States
and other European powers to ensure an integrated and economically
strong Western bloc.29 From this agreement arose a powerful group of
nations willing to aid in struggles against economic and military subjugation, especially when threatened by communist regimes.30 The Soviets
retained veto power at the UN Security Council, so through the NATO
alliance, the United States and Western Europe were able to achieve a
resolution that existed outside the Security Council, yet still followed the

26. S. Res. 192, 78th Cong. (1943) (enacted) (“That, pursuant to the Constitution of the United
States, any treaty made to effect the purposes of this resolution, on behalf of the Government of the
United States with any other nation or any association of nations, shall be made only by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.”).
27. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1244–45 (“Senator Claude Pepper . . . opposed any delegation
of Congress’s war-declaring power to an international body but believed that it would be permissible for American troops to be used, without prior congressional approval, as a ‘police force’ to
combat aggression in small wars.”); see also John T. Correll, Police Action, AIR FORCE MAG. (June
1, 2000), https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0600edit/ [https://perma.cc/6GV9-XGC8] (“To get
around the necessity of asking Congress to declare war, President Truman called it a ‘police action.’”); Leon Edel, Letter to the Editor, Truman’s ‘Police Action’, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1990 (§
7), at 54 (clarifying that Truman deliberately called fighting in Korea a “police action,” contradicting correspondent who claimed Truman had accidentally mislabeled it as such).
28. See sources cited supra note 27 and accompanying text (explaining constraint on president’s
unilateral power to deploy military in context of UN action).
29. By signing the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the United States, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United
Kingdom agreed to collectivize military operations. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), 1949, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, [hereinafter NATO, 1949], https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nato [https://perma.cc/QY2B-AY3X] (last visited Sept. 24, 2021); see also Dru
Brenner-Beck, Federalism and the Treaty Power: Breaking the “Bond(s)” Between Nations: The
Treaty Power and Status of Forces Agreements, 5 AM. U. NAT’L SEC. L. BRIEF 1, 6 (2014) (“[T]he
United States sought to incorporate the lessons drawn from its experience in the recent devastating
total warfare of World War II and establish a world-wide standard of humanity in warfare.”); Olivier Barsalou, Making Humanitarian Law in the Cold: The Cold War, The United State and the
Genesis of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 11–12 (Inst. for Int’l L. & Just. Emerging Scholars
Working Paper No. 11, 2008), http://iilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Barsalou-Making-Humanitarian-Law-in-the-Cold-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XVM-8LRK] (explaining that NATO
countries were committed to preventing future wars as a collective).
30. See sources cited supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing NATO founding members’ commitment to avoid future international wars).
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UN Charter.31
Congress was concerned with the creation of NATO, primarily because the European bloc wanted clear assurances that the United States
would intervene if and when an attack occurred on European soil.32 This
sort of “automatic” declaration of war did not sit well with members of
Congress, as it directly contravened their constitutional war powers.33
Shortly thereafter, North Korea attacked South Korea, and Truman,
along with NATO allies, committed forces to the peninsula before the
UN Security Council had officially authorized the military action.34
Later, Truman excused the action as an “emergency case” such that
retroactive authority from Congress was permissible.35 He argued that
Korea was merely a “police action,” attempting to characterize the affair
as something short of all-out armed conflict.36 Therefore, congressional
31. See Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 84th Cong. 4 (1955) (statement of Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Sec’y of
State) (noting that the Korean War outbreak at the time of Geneva Convention ratification raised
issues for Convention’s viability in a war with non-parties); see also Barsalou, supra note 29, at 12
(“With the advent of the Cold War, U.S. officials working in the DoS slowly came to the conclusion
that the unity of international law should be read in conjunction with the preservation of Western
values against the communist threat.”); Brenner-Beck, supra note 29, at 6–7 (“The commencement
of both the Cold War and the Korean War resulted in the creation of new multi-lateral alliances
designed to meet the challenge of global communism . . . .”).
32. NATO, 1949, supra note 29; A Short History of NATO, N. ATL. TREATY ORG.,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_139339.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/AXX4-RP9Y].
33. See NATO, 1949, supra note 29 (“Negotiations worked toward finding language that would
reassure the European states but not obligate the United States to act in a way that violated its own
laws.”); see also Fisher, supra note 5, at 1255 (explaining that senators vehemently argued that
automatic war declaration would not result from a NATO response).
34. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1261 (“The fact is that President Truman committed U.S. forces
to Korea before the Council called for military action.”); see also MERLE MILLER, PLAIN
SPEAKING: AN ORAL BIOGRAPHY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN 276 (1973) (explaining that Truman was
overtly willing to invade Korea without UN support).
35. Compare LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 1–2 (2d ed., rev. 2004) (arguing that
president may have to act without congressional approval in certain urgent and compelling emergency circumstances) with Elizabeth Goitein, The Alarming Scope of the President’s Emergency
Powers, THE ATLANTIC, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/presidentialemergency-powers/576418/ (last visted Mar. 23, 2022) [https://perma.cc/S2XS-9B6B]
Congress legislated powers that would lie dormant until the president activated them by
declaring a national emergency. . . . [H]undreds of statutory emergency powers, and four
clearly obsolete states of emergency, were in effect. For instance, the national emergency that Truman declared in 1950, during the Korean War, remained in place and was
being used to help prosecute the war in Vietnam.
36. Harry S. Truman, The President’s News Conference of June 29, 1950, TEACHING AM.
HIST., https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/the-presidents-news-conference-of-june-291950/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/7T8G-JM2C]; see also Louis Fisher, The Korean
War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 21, 25 (1995) (explaining that
Senator Pepper first used term “police action” and argued that police actions would be permissible
without congressional authorization, but not armed conflict); see generally US Enters the Korean
Conflict, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/korean-conflict (last updated May 19, 2021) [https://perma.cc/Q6KY-5UEW].

2022]

Afghanistan on a Global Stage

825

authorization was not necessary.37 The argument would take hold
throughout the rest of the twentieth century in later unilateral executive
declarations of war, with President Kennedy, and later President Johnson,
using the same analysis to justify interventions in Cuba and Vietnam.38
3. Kennedy, Johnson, and Vietnam
Kennedy assumed the same role as Truman: a democracy-touting, freedom-loving leader, hungry to transplant American democracy around the
world. He announced that the United States was “willing to defend freedom anywhere in the world,” preparing the stage for an eventual invasion
of communist Vietnam.39 This same idea propelled Kennedy into action
with Cuba, signaling a determination to prevent Marxist-Leninist regimes
in the Western hemisphere.40 Without prior authorization from the UN or
Congress, Kennedy ordered a naval response to the Soviet’s strategic
missiles in Cuba, referring to it only as a “defensive action,” not as armed
conflict.41 Later, Kennedy justified his action with remarks stating that he
conformed to the principles of the Rio Treaty and its relevant UN provisions on acts of self-defense, even though the Security Council had never
authorized the act.42
37. Brian Finucane, The Limited War Powers Precedent of the Korean “Police Action”, JUST
SEC. (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/63527/the-limited-war-powers-precedent-of-thekorean-police-action/ [https://perma.cc/9BMC-KLLR] (remarking that police action was a key
term used to justify unilateral presidential action in Korean peninsula without congressional authorization).
38. See Graham T. Allison, Making War: The President and Congress, 40 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 86, 88 (1976) (stating that Kennedy’s command authority in Cuba did not include consultation from Congress, and Johnson acted unilaterally under Congress’s “approval” of Gulf of Tonkin Resolution); see also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 176 (1973)
(“Kennedy’s action [in Cuba], which should have been celebrated as an exception, was instead
enshrined as a rule. . . . The very brilliance of Kennedy’s performance appeared to vindicate the
idea that the President must take unto himself the final judgments of war and peace.”).
39. See Marcella Murphy Agerholm, Note, Domestic and International Law Implications of a
Presidentially Declared Blockade of Cuba, 3 J. INT’L & COMP. L. 547, 556 n.70 (1982) (quoting
DAVID M. ABSHIRE, FOREIGN POLICY MAKERS: PRESIDENT VS. CONGRESS 46 (1979)).
40. See Proclamation 3504: Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba, 1962
PUB. PAPERS 809, 809–10 (Oct. 23, 1962) (“[T]he United States is determined to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from
extending, by force or threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this
hemisphere.”); see also Agerholm, supra note 39, at 560 (arguing that Cuba Resolution empowered
president to act without congressional authorization).
41. See Leonard C. Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 515, 524
(1963) (explaining that UN Charter’s limitation on use of force was designed to prevent further
creation of strategic missile bases in Cuba); see also Agerholm, supra note 39, at 564 (stating that
Kennedy carefully construed his military action as defense, grounded in UN justifications).
42. See sources cited supra note 41 and accompanying text (explaining that Kennedy justified
military action based on self-defense); see also Agerholm, supra note 39, at 564 (“Careful not to
imply a state of war or belligerency, President Kennedy referred to this [order of naval operations
in Cuba] as a defensive quarantine and grounded its justification on two legal structures of major
world importance: the Rio Treaty of 1947 and the Charter of the United Nations.”).

826

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 53

The following year, in 1962, Kennedy began sending military advisors
to Vietnam in the fight against communism.43 After the 1964 elections,
Kennedy had planned to withdraw U.S. military forces from the region.44
But in August 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution under Johnson’s insistence, giving Johnson the unilateral authority to “prevent further aggression [against the United States].”45 Under this guise,
Johnson proceeded to act without a congressional declaration of war in
Vietnam, seeing the Resolution as a preemptive war declaration.46
The 1960s and 70s brought the first example of congressional efforts
to reassert its control in the form of withdrawal politics. Congress held
hearings to pressure the president to end a wildly unpopular war.47 Senator Fulbright, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
grilled policymakers and executive officials about American interests in
Vietnam and the imperialist democratic agenda.48
When Republicans gained a majority in the House after the 1966 midterm elections, they joined forces with congressional moderates to question Johnson on the war’s budget.49 The War on Poverty at home meant
Johnson had to decide between domestic or international spending, and
Congress made him clearly aware of the moral conundrum.50
After President Nixon was elected in 1969, a slow-rolling withdrawal
43. Gerald L. Angst, 1973 War Powers Legislation: Congress Re-Asserts Its Warmaking
Power, 5 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 83, 84 (1974).
44. Allison, supra note 38, at 101.
45. H.R.J. Res. 1145, 88th Cong., 78 Stat. 384 (1964) (enacted); see also LeMar, supra note 21,
at 1050 (“Under the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, President Johnson felt that he did not need a congressional declaration of war to lawfully engage in military operations in Vietnam.”).
46. See sources cited supra note 45 and accompanying text (explaining Johnson’s reasoning for
acting unilateraly in Vietnam without a congressional declaration of war).
47. See Julian E. Zelizer, Congress and the Politics of Troop Withdrawal, 34 DIPLOMATIC HIST.
529, 530 (2010) (explaining that Vietnam War hearings captivated American public); see also
RANDALL BENNETT WOODS, FULBRIGHT: A BIOGRAPHY 411 (1995) (“[The hearings] opened a
psychological door for the great American middle class. . . . If the administration intended to wage
the war in Vietnam from the political center in America, the 1966 hearings were indeed a blow to
that effort.”).
48. See Vietnam Hearings, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Vietnam_Hearings.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/W79G-HWZS] (“Attempting to forestall a buildup of American forces, Fulbright launched a high-profile series of
widely televised public ‘educational’ hearings in February 1966.”); Legislative Proposals Relating
to the War in Southeast Asia: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong. 686
(1971) (“The Administration proclaims that its goal in Vietnam is the assurance of self-determination for the South Vietnamese people. That is a plain deception.”). See generally 112 CONG. REC.
10615–16 (1966); Videotape: Reel America: 1966 Fulbright Vietnam Hearings, Dean Rusk (CSPAN 1966), https://www.c-span.org/video/?404584-1/1966-fulbright-vietnam-hearings-deanrusk [https://perma.cc/EKX3-KA46].
49. Zelizer, supra note 47, at 533.
50. See id. at 533 (“Johnson agreed to a tax surcharge to quell the inflationary impact of the war
and to continue to fund the War on Poverty.”); see generally Tom Riddell, The Inflationary Impact
of the Vietnam War, 1 VIETNAM GENERATION 42, 55–57 (1989).
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from Vietnam began, but congressional Democrats demanded more.51
They rallied to cut defense spending, passed a resolution to reclaim their
power,52 and pressed for military reductions in Southeast Asia after
threats of hostility in Thailand began brewing.53
The end of 1969 finally brought tangible bills to cut off spending on
foreign policy.54 In 1971, Congress strongly pressured Nixon to withdraw
troops within nine months after the passage of the Cooper-Church
Amendment.55 Nixon protested, so Congress watered it down to a policy
statement rather than a congressional rule.56 By 1972, the Senate supported the Case-Church Amendment, which sought to end all funding for
war operations in Southeast Asia except as it related to withdrawal.57 In
1973, Congress passed the Amendment, prohibiting the use of more funds
in Southeast Asia after August 15.58 Finally, in 1973 the U.S. Supreme
Court considered whether Nixon’s action could be enjoined by the vote
of Congress.59 The Court found that congressional appropriations for the
military “constitute a form of authorization for the conduct of hostilities.”60 It was in this context that Congress began to more seriously assert
its power, both in times of war and withdrawal, by passing the War Powers Resolution of 1973.
B. The War Powers Resolution
Nixon’s Congress was fed up with unregulated executive war-making
powers, and in 1973, the legislature passed the War Powers Resolution
51. Zelizer, supra note 47, at 535 (arguing that congressional Democrats wanted more spending
cuts on defense because of spiraling arms race during Cold War).
52. S. Res. 85, 91st Cong. (1969) (enacted).
53. Id.; see also LEWIS L. GOULD, THE MOST EXCLUSIVE CLUB: A HISTORY OF THE MODERN
UNITED STATES SENATE 259 (2005) (explaining Democrats’ persistence boded well for their Senate power during 1970 elections, allowing them to place more pressure to leave Southeast Asia).
54. See GOULD, supra note 53, at 258 (stating that Senators Church and Cooper were convinced
they could cut off Vietnam funding); see also Zelizer, supra note 47, at 536 (“In a closed-floor
session, Senators Church and . . . Cooper . . . offered an amendment to a defense spending bill to
prevent the further use of money in Laos or Thailand.”).
55. Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Pub. L. 91-652, 84 Stat. 1942 (1971).
56. Id.
57. Pub. L. 93-52, § 108, 87 Stat. 130, 134 (1973).
58. Id.
59. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1304 (1973).
60. Seth Weinberger, Restoring the Balance: The Hamdan Decision and Executive Powers, 42
TULSA L. REV. 681, 688 (2007). The court found that
Congress in appropriation bills from 1965 through 1969 had shown “its continued support of the Vietnam action” and that Congress’ choice of appropriations bills rather than
a formal declaration of war to effectuate its intent involved a political question which
did not prevent the finding that the fighting in Vietnam was authorized by Congress and
that such fighting was not a usurpation of power by either of the Presidents who had
been in office after 1964.
Id. (citing Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553, 561 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)).
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over Nixon’s veto.61
Among the Resolution’s provisions is a requirement that the president
issue a detailed report to the speaker of the House of Representatives and
the president pro tempore of the Senate within forty-eight hours of committing troops absent congressional declaration.62 Additionally, all troops
must be withdrawn from hostilities within sixty days unless Congress authorizes otherwise.63 The president may also request a thirty-day extension if necessary.64 Only three circumstances allow a president to commit
troops without a declaration of war:
1) Hostilities where involvement is imminent, based on the context.
2) Combat deployments to territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign
state, barring those solely for supplies or training of foreign forces.
3) Enlargement of armed forces currently located in a foreign state that
are prepared for combat.65
Many scholars have argued that the Resolution is only “a congressional
view of the war powers,” and therefore does not impose mandatory limitations on the executive branch.66 Some scholars have posited that the
61. Joint Resolution Concerning the War Powers of Congress and the President, H.R.J. Res.
542, 93d Cong., Pub. L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973); see also War Powers Resolution of 1973,
RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM (July 27, 2021), https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/news/war-powers-resolution-1973 [https://perma.cc/X9X4-Y7D3] (“Congress overrode
[Nixon’s] veto, and the resolution became law following the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in early
1973.”).
62. H.R.J. Res. 542; see also LeMar, supra note 21, at 1050 (“[W]hen there is no congressional
declaration of war, the War Powers Resolution requires the President to submit a report to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate within fortyeight hours of any introcution of American troops into hostilities.”).
63. H.R.J. Res. 542; LeMar, supra note 21, at 1050–51.
64. H.R.J. Res. 542; LeMar, supra note 21, at 1051.
65. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 93D CONG., JAN. 3,
1973–DEC. 20, 1974, at 115. But see also H.R.J. Res. 542 (“The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are
exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a
national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its
armed forces.”).
66. John Norton Moore, The War Powers Resolution of Doubtful Constitutionality, 70 A.B.A.
J. 10, 12 (1984). See also id. (“The essence of the resolution is an effort by Congress to define the
war powers of Congress and the president. But nothing could be clearer, as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Myers v. United States, than that the constitutional scheme of separation of powers
cannot be altered by one branch or indeed by anything short of constitutional amendment.” (citation
omitted)); c.f. Frederick S. Tipson, The War Powers Resolution Is Constitutional and Enforceable,
70 A.B.A. J. 10, 12 (1984)
[I]f the president is presumed to derive different, and at times plenary, authority in foreign affairs from the fact of congressional inaction, it should also follow that the Congress can effectively remove such an implication by registering its disapproval—or lack
of support—by majority vote—that is, concurrent resolution. Even if Congress could
not completely confine the president’s actions in any given case, it should certainly be
able to counter any suggestion that he is acting with the ‘implied consent’ of the legislative branch and thereby the full authority of the United States government.
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Resolution falls within Congress’s power to define the word “war” within
their Article I powers.67 Other scholars have maintained that even if the
Resolution does not fully bind the executive branch, Congress can still
enforce its position through the purse power.68 Regardless of whether the
Resolution is effective as enforceable law, it nevertheless created a level
of cooperation and synergy between the two branches, balancing action
with restraint.69
In terms of the Resolution’s real purpose, many critics have contended
that it was nothing more than a cover for the embarrassment and shame
Congress felt for supporting the unsuccessful war in Vietnam, as members of the body attempted to paint themselves as victims of a sneaky
president who acted without congressional consent.70 Nonetheless, the
Resolution remains good law today and serves as confirmation that the
president can affirmatively command armed forces, execute statutes, and
initiate action, subject to Congress’s regulations.
C. 9/11 and Its Aftermath
Initial planning for the 9/11 attacks began in 1996, when Osama bin
67. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 103 (1972) (arguing
that the Resolution falls within Congress’s constitutional powers, but it is possible for president to
exploit its vagueness); see also Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV 101, 101–02 (1984) (“[The War Powers Resolution] is constitutional because
it defines the war power. The War Powers Resolution is nothing more or less than a congressional
definition of the word ‘war’ in article I. A definition of this kind coupled with a reasonable enforcement mechanism is well within the power of Congress . . . .”).
68. See Tipson, supra note 66, at 14 (“[I]f the Court were unwilling to [resolve a confrontation
between the President and Congress] . . . Congress would have little choice but to enforce its position through the funding process.”); see also Michael J. Glennon, Strengthening the War Powers
Resolution: The Case for Purse-String Restrictions, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1, 30 (1975)
Far from giving the President power over the purse so that he could carry out the commander-in-chief clause . . . the Framers believed it “particularly dangerous to give the
keys of the treasury, and the command of the army, into the same hands.” As a result,
they transferred the war power, in the words of Jefferson, “from the Executive to the
Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay.”
(first quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 38, at 247 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961); and then
quoting THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 397 (J. Boyd ed., 1958)).
69. See Peter M. Shane, Learning McNamara’s Lessons: How the War Powers Resolution Advances the Rule of Law, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1281, 1299–1300 (1997) (“[I]f one reviews the
actual behavior of the two branches, it is clear that they have achieved a modus vivendi, an ‘effective
law’ of war powers that balances a de facto legislative delegation of ‘strike operation’ discretion to
the executive against a significantly constraining process within which the executive must proceed
if it is intent on any lengthy or massive military deployment.”).
70. See Andrew K. Schiff, The War Powers Resolution: From the Halls of Congress to the Hills
of Bosnia, Inertia Should Give Way to Post-Cold War Reality, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 877,
907 (1996) (“The Resolution is a failed attempt to assuage the post-Vietnam shame and grief that
followed the nation’s Indochina experience.”); cf. Carter, supra note 67, at 102 (“To cynics, [the
Resolution] was Congress’ way of pretending that the Vietnam War had somehow been a fast one
pulled by the executive branch, rather than a disaster jointly managed by two Presidents and five
Congresses.”).
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Laden introduced his first Islamic law opinion, or fatwā, in which he demanded American soldiers leave Saudi Arabia.71 Under the teachings of
Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s opinions became more radicalized, until
he eventually called for his followers to attack American citizens in pursuit of jihad72 against the foreign enemy responsible for imperialist agendas in the Middle East.73 Though bin Laden never formally admitted to
his orchestration of the 9/11 attacks, videotapes revealed that he planned
to “hit the economy” of the United States to deal a heavy blow to the
military, which he saw as the main agent of American foreign policy.74
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the shock
and anger produced a national fervor against bin Laden and al-Qaeda.75
The country’s leaders were intent on destroying a common enemy.76
1. The Authorization for Use of Military Force
The first government response to the terror attacks came with the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) of 2001.77 The AUMF was
a joint resolution of Congress passed by the legislature on September 14,
2001, and subsequently signed into law by President Bush on September
18, 2001.78
71. J.M.B. Porter, Osama bin-Laden, Jihād, and the Sources of International Terrorism, 13 IND.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 871, 871 (2003); see 9/11 COMM’N, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 48
(2002), https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YVF-3MH3]
(stating that bin Laden had issued his own fatwa calling on Muslims to drive Americans out of
Saudi Arabia and condemning Saudi monarchy).
72. Though the term jihad is widely stereotyped as an Arabic word for “terrorism,” it is defined
as “a holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty” or “a personal struggle in devotion to
Islam especially involving spiritual discipline.” See Jihad, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jihad
(last
visited
Feb.
21,
2022)
[https://perma.cc/ZC99-2EQP].
73. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 71, at 47 (“Claiming that America had declared war against God and his messenger, [bin Laden and al Zawahiri] called for the murder of
any American, anywhere on earth, as the ‘individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any
country in which it is possible to do it.’”).
74. MARTIN C. LIBICKI ET. AL., EXPLORING TERRORIST TARGETING PREFERENCES 60 (2007);
see also Julian Borger & Rory Carroll, US at a Loss Despite Claims bin Laden Is in Pakistan, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 27, 2001, 8:06 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/dec/28/afghanistan.rorycarroll3 [https://perma.cc/WH48-YHHY] (reporting bin Laden’s call for Muslims to continue targeting U.S. economy following 9/11 attacks).
75. See generally Douglas Kellner, 9/11, Spectacles of Terror, and Media Manipulation, 1
CRITICAL DISCOURSE STUD. 41, 44–51 (2004).
76. See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg, A NATION AT WAR: THE NEWS MEDIA; Cable’s War Coverage
Suggests a New “Fox Effect” on Television Journalism, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2003),
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/16/us/nation-war-media-cable-s-war-coverage-suggests-newfox-effect-television.html [https://perma.cc/9PJA-4973] (describing media discourse following
9/11 attacks). For an analysis of the political barbarism associated with the Bush administration in
the aftermath of 9/11, see generally DOUGLAS KELLNER, FROM 9/11 TO TERROR WAR: THE
DANGERS OF THE BUSH LEGACY (2003).
77. AUMF, supra note 6.
78. Id.
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The sole dissenting vote against the AUMF came from Representative
Barbara Lee. Representative Lee argued that the AUMF gave the president unlimited power to wage war without any checks and balances.79
She believed that emotions were too high to pass such an extreme law,
and the nation needed to settle itself before moving forward with any
concrete action.80 As the only representative to vote against the resolution, many Congress members attacked her for being anti-American, and
she received countless death threats from American citizens who called
her a communist and traitor to the nation.81 Capitol Police eventually provided her and her family bodyguards because of the hostility surrounding
her vote.82
The AUMF ultimately raised many questions of interpretation about
the geographic scope and duration of armed conflict that remain unanswered to this day.
2. Executive Action Under the AUMF
The AUMF broadly authorized the president to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts
of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.83

The language of the AUMF allows the president to use force against
nonstate actors not limited to Afghanistan, but rather anywhere in the
world, that may have any linkage to 9/11.84 The prevention clause is of
particular note, authorizing the president to act preemptively against terrorist threats.85
79. Mike Ryan, Rep. Barbara Lee’s Speech Opposing the Post 9/11 Use of Force Act, NUCLEAR
AGE PEACE FOUND. (Sept. 14, 2001), https://www.wagingpeace.org/rep-barbara-lees-speech-opposing-the-post-9-11-use-of-force-act/ [https://perma.cc/VQA4-LTHM].
80. Id.
81. For copies of some of the letters received by Rep. Lee, see Conor Friedersdorf, Angry Letters to the One Member of Congress Who Voted Against the War on Terror, THE ATLANTIC (Sept.
14, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/09/the-vindication-of-barbaralee/380084/ [https://perma.cc/NZK3-46KR] (describing letters expressing both support and disapproval for Lee’s dissenting vote).
82. Peter Carlson, The Solitary Vote of Barbara Lee, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2001),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/2001/09/19/the-solitary-vote-of-barbara-lee/fb
86aee7-3cc5-4cbd-98f1-e2650e545f42/ [https://perma.cc/4PGP-MRYG]; see Austin Wright, How
Barbara Lee Became an Army of One, POLITICO MAG. (July 30, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/07/30/how-barbara-lee-became-an-army-of-one-215434/
[https://perma.cc/24ZG-EJV3] (describing how Capitol Police accompanied Rep. Lee to her office,
house, church services, and grocery store).
83. AUMF, supra note 6.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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With this backing, Bush invaded Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.86
By December 9, 2001, U.S. forces had driven the Taliban from power,
forcing al-Qaeda into the Tora Bora mountainous region of Afghanistan.87 Under the AUMF, Bush also indefinitely detained hundreds of
prisoners of war at Guantánamo Bay.88 American forces denied prisoners
their right to a trial and tortured many detainees in violation of international human rights and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.89
Additionally, the AUMF was invoked to authorize trial by military commission.90 During this period, the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
interpreted the AUMF to allow detention of al-Qaeda enemy fighters for
the duration of the relevant conflict.91 However, in Boumediene v. Bush,92
the Court held that Guantánamo detainees had the right to seek a writ of
habeas corpus in U.S. federal courts, even though the Bush administration
argued that Guantánamo fell outside U.S. jurisdiction, and its detainees
were therefore not subject to constitutional protections.93
President Obama was more covert in his executive action under the
AUMF, using it as the legal foundation to apply force against multiple
terrorist organizations throughout the world.94 The Obama administration
expanded the meaning of “al-Qaeda enemy fighters” under Hamdi,
86. The U.S. War in Afghanistan, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan (last visited Sept. 26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9VUE-32R5].
87. Id.
88. See generally Jonathan Masters, Guantánamo Bay: Twenty Years of Counterterrorism and
Controversy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Oct. 5, 2021, 3:55 PM), https://www.cfr.org/article/guantanamo-bay-twenty-years-counterterrorism-and-controversy
[https://perma.cc/2D92LS7D].
89. See generally World Report 2003: United States, HUM. RTS. WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k3/us.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2021) [https://perma.cc/32CNZMDE]; Masters, supra note 88.
90. See Haridimos V. Thravalos, Comment, The Military Commission in the War on Terrorism,
51 VILL. L. REV. 737, 738 (2006) (stating that Bush’s issuance of a military order authorizing commissions to try al-Qaeda members was constitutionally controversial). See generally OFF. OF PUB.
AFFS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. THE NSA PROGRAM TO DETECT AND PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS
MYTH V. REALITY (2006), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/docs/nsa_myth_v_reality.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FM2U-FC3S]; JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31600, THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RULES FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS: ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURAL
RULES AND COMPARISON WITH PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY
JUSTICE 9 (2006).
91. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
92. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 723 (2008).
93. Id. at 732–33, 739. See also REED BRODY, HUM. RTS. WATCH, GETTING AWAY WITH
TORTURE: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND MISTREATMENT OF DETAINEES 49 (2011),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0711webwcover_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7468BS8] (“The 2006 Military Commissions Act revised the War Crimes Act and limited the definition
of war crimes, with retroactive effect. As a result, humiliating and degrading treatment of detainees
in US counterterrorism operations following the September 11 attacks can no longer be charged as
war crimes under the statute.”).
94. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Obama’s AUMF Legacy, 110 AM.
J. INT’L L. 628 (2016).

2022]

Afghanistan on a Global Stage

833

arguing that the authorization to detain also applied to any “associated
forces,” whether inside Afghanistan or not.95 Additionally, Obama relied
on the AUMF in preemptive counterterrorism efforts, most notoriously
with drone strikes and cyberoperations.96 These target missions frequently occurred in areas outside of active hostilities, such as Somalia,
Yemen, and Syria.97 Later, the AUMF was construed to authorize military force against the Islamic State, which had once been an “associated
force” with al-Qaeda but had subsequently disbanded from the same network.98
President Trump used the AUMF of 2002, otherwise known as the Iraq
Resolution, to direct the fatal drone attack of Iranian major general
Qasem Soleimani outside Baghdad International Airport.99 The Iraq Resolution authorized executive use of force against Saddam Hussein and the
Iraqi Government in what became known as Operation Iraqi Freedom.100
95. Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to
Detainees Held at Guantánamo Bay at 1–2, In re Guatánamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. No.
08-442 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009), ECF No. 1690; see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 94, at 633
(“The Obama administration . . . [construed] the AUMF to authorize the U.S. military to detain
four groups of individuals: (1) members of Taliban forces; (2) members of Al Qaeda forces who
are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; (3) members of associated forces; and (4) those persons who have given substantial support to one of the other groups.”).
96. See Micah Zenko, Opinion, Obama’s Embrace of Drone Strikes Will Be a Lasting Legacy,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2016, 2:57 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/01/12/reflecting-on-obamas-presidency/obamas-embrace-of-drone-strikes-will-be-a-lasting-legacy
[https://perma.cc/S657-TFY9] (“Obama has authorized 506 strikes that have killed 3,040 terrorists
and 391 civilians.”); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 94, at 635 (arguing that counterterrorism targeting became more controversial during Obama’s presidency due to his increased use of
drones under the AUMF).
97. CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: THE RELENTLESS RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY
AND SECRECY 224–27 (Little, Brown & Co. 2015); see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 94, at
635 (“[Actions included] air strikes against al-Shabaab in Somalia, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, and the Khorosan Group in Syria.”).
98. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 94, at 637.
99. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING
THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS
3 (2018), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Report-to-Congress-on-legal-andpolicy-frameworks-guiding-use-of-military-force-.pdf [https://perma.cc/J76D-HVCC]
Although the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq was the primary focus
of the 2002 AUMF, the statute, in accordance with its express goals, has always been
understood to authorize the use of force for the related dual purposes of helping to establish a stable, democratic Iraq and for the purpose of addressing terrorist threats emanating from Iraq. . . . [The 2002 AUMF] contains no geographic limitation on where
authorized force may be employed.
See also Warren P. Strobel, White House Cites 2002 Iraq War Measure to Justify Killing Soleimani,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2020, 3:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-cites-2002-iraqwar-measure-to-justify-killing-soleimani-11581711789 [https://perma.cc/4A86-VYCT] (explaining that White House justified drone strike that killed Soleimani under 2002 AUMF).
100. See CLAYTON THOMAS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46148, KILLING OF QASEM SOLEIMANI:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 14 (2020) (“Congress enacted the 2002 AUMF prior to the 2003
U.S. invasion of Iraq that toppled the government of Saddam Hussein, authorizing the President to
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The Trump administration justified the strike as a necessary preemptive
measure to stop an “imminent attack” after Iranian Hezbollah militia were
alleged to have launched a rocket, killing an American on Iraqi soil.101
The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad was later targeted, which subsequently led
to Trump’s decision to launch a drone strike on Soleimani.102 However,
this attack has been widely condemned on a national and international
level, with the UN calling it a likely violation of international and domestic law.103 The U.S. House of Representatives later voted to repeal the
Iraq Resolution; Representative Lee sponsored the repeal bill.104
III. AFGHANISTAN AND THE SUPREME COURT
This section sets out the historic background of the war in Afghanistan,
retelling turbulent events from the Soviet-Afghan War, the rise of the
Taliban, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, and the withdrawal process of
2021, with a more contextualized focus on America’s ineffective foreign
policy. Then, it turns to a constitutional analysis of relevant war-powers
and treaty-powers cases decided by the Supreme Court as early as the
French-American conflict of 1798. This analysis takes note of the interpretation of congressional power since the nation’s beginnings, as well as
the vague legal precedent on war and treaty powers from the nation’s
early cases.

use the U.S. military to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions targeting the Hussein
regime . . . .”); see also Operation Iraqi Freedom, NAVAL HIST. & HERITAGE COMMAND (Aug. 6,
2020, 11:21 AM), https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/middle-east/operation-iraqi-freedom.html [https://perma.cc/K384-JHQ3] (describing beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003).
101. See Statement by the Department of Defense, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Jan. 2, 2020),
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2049534/statement-by-the-departmentof-defense/ [https://perma.cc/56B2-MX48] (announcing air strike that killed Soleimani); see also
Scott R. Anderson, Did the President Have the Domestic Legal Authority to Kill Qassem Soleimani?, LAWFARE BLOG (Jan. 3, 2020, 4:49 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/did-presidenthave-domestic-legal-authority-kill-qassem-soleimani [https://perma.cc/2JHE-3WQC] (explaining
that Trump administration blamed Soleimani for killing American service members and authorizing
a rocket attack and embassy assault in Baghdad).
102. Anderson, supra note 101; see also Merrit Kennedy & Barbara Campbell, U.S. Sends Reinforcements as Protesters Try to Enter U.S. Embassy Compound in Baghdad, NPR (Dec. 31, 2019,
8:45 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/31/792579958/mob-angered-by-airstrikes-tries-to-stormu-s-embassy-compound-in-baghdad [https://perma.cc/N62H-JMFA] (reporting attack on U.S. Embassy in Baghdad by group of protesters suspected to be backed by Iranian-affiliated Kataib Hezbollah, and following earlier attack that killed U.S. military contractor).
103. Agnès Callamard (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions), Use of Armed Drones for Targeted Killings, ⁋⁋ 60–64, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/44/38 (Aug. 15,
2020), https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/44/38 [https://perma.cc/78WX-YRQW] (concluding that U.S.
justification for drone strikes against Soleimani was a prohibited use of force as set out in Article
2(4) of the UN Charter, implicating expansionist military efforts in international arena).
104. H.R. Res. 256, 117th Cong. (2021).
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A. The War in Afghanistan
In 1979, at the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.105 A communist regime had overtaken the Afghan government
the year before, and its fierce brutality prompted uprisings, eventually
causing the Soviets to intervene to quell the dissent.106
The Afghan Communist Party had formed in 1965, led primarily by
Babrak Karmal and Nur Mohammad Taraki.107 In 1973, the previous
king, Mohammed Zahir Shah, was overthrown and a democratic republic
was established in Afghanistan.108 After Nikita Khrushchev had formally
agreed in the 1950s to help the State bring about stability, Afghanistan
remained closely tied to the Soviets, particularly following the 1973 uprising.109 While the new democratic regime led by Mohammad Daoud
Khan granted many rights and freedoms, it also brutally cracked down on
dissenters.110 By 1977, the Afghan Communist Party had gained
105. Benjamin Parkin, Afghanistan: A History of Failed Foreign Occupations, FIN. TIMES
(Aug.
19,
2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/aa351a06-29b4-435d-a3fb-df87425cee38
[https://perma.cc/KY6X-9UQ8]; A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 30,
2021, 5:27 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/asia-jan-june11-timeline-afghanistan
[https://perma.cc/S4F7-T36A].
106. Liz Dee, The Saur Revolution: Prelude to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, ASS’N FOR
DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING (Apr. 22, 2016), https://adst.org/2016/04/the-saur-revolutionprelude-to-the-soviet-invasion-of-afghanistan/ [https://perma.cc/6SS4-9QL4].
107. NABI MISDAQ, AFGHANISTAN: POLITICAL FRAILTY AND EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE 107
(2006).
108. See id. at 88 (“Saudi officials warned President Daoud, who took power by overthrowing
his cousin, King Zahir Shah in 1973, against relying on the Communists to consolidate his rule.”);
see also CARY GLADSTONE, AFGHANISTAN REVISITED 43 (2001) (“In 1973 Daoud emerged from
the political wilderness to overthrow the monarchy and establish the Republic of Afghanistan
. . . .”).
109. See WILSON CTR., HIST. & PUB. POL’Y PROGRAM DIGIT. ARCHIVE, INFORMATION ON
KHRUSHCHEV AND BULGANIN’S NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1955 TRIP TO INDIA, BURMA, AND
AFGHANISTAN, FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
THE
SED
5
(Jan.
11,
1956),
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119273.pdf?v=33d2462fbf232d187cccf15c543566c4 [https://perma.cc/E2EN-E6S5] (“[T]he
leading Afghan statesmen are aware of the meaning of maintaining good relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. This fact was given expression through the prolongation by 10
years of the signed 1931 treaty of neutrality and mutual non-aggression . . . .”); see also R. K.
Ramazani, Afghanistan and the USSR, 12 MIDDLE E. J. 144, 148–49 (1958) (“In the face of . . .
economic strangulation the Afghan Government turned to the Soviet Union for assistance. A transit
agreement was promptly concluded, and Afghanistan acquired the right of duty-free transit for her
goods over Soviet territory.”); N.A. Bulganin and N.S. Khrushchev in Afghanistan, Introduction,
WORLD
DIGIT.
LIBR.
(Dec.
19,
2017),
https://www.wdl.org/
en/item/19376/ [https://perma.cc/B27F-XVX3] (“At the conclusion of the visit, the two governments issued a joint statement in which they affirmed their agreement on the issues of disarmament,
the banning of atomic weapons, and need for peace in the world; signed a protocol on extending
for another ten years the agreement on neutrality and mutual nonaggression between the USSR and
Afghanistan . . . and released a communiqué on economic relations between the USSR and Afghanistan.”).
110. Parkin, supra note 105; see also A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan, supra note 105
(explaining that although Khan introduced women’s rights and modernization, he also cracked
down on any dissenters of his regime).
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underground support and built a coalition to overthrow the government.111 In 1978, Khan was killed, and Taraki, one of the original leaders
of the Communist Party, took control of Afghanistan. 112 Karmal also became deputy prime minister.113
Following the overthrow, the communists implemented their agenda,
declaring equality and enacting land reform, but also doling out harsh
penalties for anyone who dissented.114 Local economies of farmers, who
made up the vast majority of Afghanistan’s population, were largely disenfranchised by the land-reform program, in which the Afghan government nationalized private land.115 During this period, the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan to help stabilize the nation’s communist rule.116
A group of insurgents began planning a counter-resistance to the communists.117 These informal groups were primarily made up of rural farmers, traders, and young men who wanted to fight for the sovereignty of

111. See BRUCE RIEDEL, WHAT WE WON: AMERICA’S SECRET WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, 1979–
1989, at 17 (2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Chapter-1-3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K8GX-L2UJ] (remarking that 1978 assassination of Khyber, a prominent communist, was blamed on Khan and the CIA, and communists organized a large demonstration in
Kabul that set the stage for a coup); see also Simon Winchester, Top Communist Politician Named
as Leader of Afghan Government, WASH. POST (May 1, 1978), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1978/05/01/top-communist-politician-named-as-leader-of-afghangovernment/f45ce2f1-de8c-4d6d-a451-efb94757cacf/ [https://perma.cc/KD42-N34T] (reporting
that Taraki, who became head of Afghanistan’s government after the overthrow of President Khan,
had been named chairman of the United Communist Party when the various factions merged in
1977).
112. See Winchester, supra note 111 (stating that Taraki was declared “founder of the revolution,” President of Afghanistan, and prime minister of newly formed government).
113. See RIEDEL, supra note 111, at 17 (“Nur Muhammad Taraki, the leader of the Khalq faction, became president and prime minister, with Babrak Karmal as deputy prime minister . . . .”).
114. See id. (“The sexes were declared equal, and a minimum age was set for marriage, 16 years
for girls and 18 for boys. Dowries were restricted to encourage girls to have more choices. In a
deeply religious society, especially among the Pashtuns, the new policies were an affront to religious and tribal customs. The state now seemed determined to decide the terms of marriage and
interfere in family decisions. In addition, an ambitious but poorly thought-out land reform program
was embarked on . . . .”); see also Huma Ahmed-Ghosh, A History of Women in Afghanistan:
Lessons Learnt for the Future or Yesterdays and Tomorrow: Women in Afghanistan, 4 J. OF INT’L
WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 6 (2003) (explaining that this period was considered the second era of women’s
reform and a time of other revolutionary social change).
115. See RIEDEL, supra note 111, at 17 (“Large land holdings were seized by the state, alienating important local power brokers. Widespread arrests were carried out of anyone objecting to the
new reforms . . . .”); see also M. Siddieq Noorzoy, Alternative Economic Systems for Afghanistan,
15 INT’L J. OF MIDDLE E. STUD. 25, 25 (1983) (highlighting the disastrous nature of the hasty land
reform programs that were considered unacceptable by many of Afghanistan’s rural citizens).
116. See Parkin, supra note 105; A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan, supra note 105.
117. See RIEDEL, supra note 111, at 18 (“Resistance to the regime began almost immediately
after the coup. By the fall of 1978, Kabul and the communists had lost control of parts of the country
. . . .”); see also Tahir Amin, Afghan Resistance: Past, Present, and Future, 24 ASIAN SURV. 373,
375–79 (1984) (explaining resistance movement’s origins and outcome and asserting that resistence
movement in fact originated during earlier constitutional period in 1963–73).
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Afghanistan as an independent nation.118 The informal collection of
groups became known as the mujahideen, or “strugglers” in Arabic, who
waged a “holy war” against the Soviets on behalf of a religious and national duty.119 The mujahideen were supported with arms, funding, and
training by the United States, Pakistan, and other allies fighting communist regimes around the globe.120 Though the mujahideen eventually
succeeded in driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan, much of the country
was destroyed and civil society was practically nonexistent.121
Ultimately, the unrest caused a civil war as certain groups vied for positions of power in the Afghan government.122 The various mujahideen
factions fought one another, and one main group rose to power, known

118. See Lindsay Maizland, The Taliban in Afghanistan, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Sept. 15,
2021, 11:30 AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan [https://perma.cc/56GEM32M] (“[The mujahideen] were joined by younger Pashtun tribesman who studied in Pakistani
madrassas, or seminaries.”); see also ALI AHMAD JALALI & LESTER W. GRAU, THE OTHER SIDE
OF THE MOUNTAIN: MUJAHIDEEN TACTICS IN THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR 267 (1999) (“The rural
population willingly provided food and shelter to the Mujahideen, since the Mujahideen were
mostly local residents. The Soviets decided to attack Mujahideen logistics by forcing the rural population off of their farms and into refugee camps . . . .”).
119. See Parkin, supra note 105 (explaining that loosely organized factions of local insurgents
waged war against Soviets and Afghan communists, with U.S. and Pakistani support); see also
JALALI & GRAU, supra note 118, at xvi (stating that religious leaders issued statements of jihad
against communist regime in an attempt to gain support for mujahideen).
120. A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan, supra note 105; see also JALALI & GRAU, supra note
118, at xviii (“The United States, Peoples Republic of China, Britain, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates began funneling military, humanitarian and financial aid to
the Mujahideen through Pakistan.”).
121. Afghanistan’s sovereignty was threatened immensely from the guerrilla war tactics used
by the mujahideen and Soviet fighters, quickly eroding the communist regime and any sense of
political stability. See Minna Jaffery, War Haunts Afghanistan 40 Years After Soviet Invasion,
NEWLINES INST. (Jan. 1, 2020), https://newlinesinstitute.org/civil-military-relations/war-haunts-afghanistan-40-years-after-soviet-invasion/ [https://perma.cc/3Q2A-NYPW] (describing struggle for
Afghanistan as tied to religious ideology as much as political); see also Alan Taylor, The Soviet
War in Afghanistan, 1979–1989, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/08/the-soviet-war-in-afghanistan-1979-1989/100786/
[https://perma.cc/H8AW-Y2DU] (“In the brutal nine-year conflict, an estimated one million civilians were killed, as well as 90,000 Mujahideen fighters, 18,000 Afghan troops, and 14,500 Soviet
soldiers. Civil war raged after the withdrawal, setting the stage for the Taliban’s takeover of the
country in 1996.”).
122. See NEAMATOLLAH NOJUMI, THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN IN AFGHANISTAN: MASS
MOBILIZATION, CIVIL WAR, AND THE FUTURE OF THE REGION 60 (2002) (“The internal interaction
of Afghan armed political forces from the Afghan government and Afghan resistance factions left
the UN peace plan without any power or ability to succeed. A bloody civil war shattered this already
war-ruined country and forced the Afghans into larger fragmentation.”); see also Nasreen Ghufran,
The Taliban and the Civil War Entanglement in Afghanistan, 41 ASIAN SURV. 462, 465 (2001)
(“[T]he actors in Afghanistan’s civil war do not entertain the route of negotiations and choose instead to continue pursuing war. In the Afghan civil war, different players have participated in it and
changed their roles over time, but none have been willing to negotiate in a flexible manner to conclude a settlement.”).
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as the Taliban.123 As strict Islamists, the Taliban imposed harsh, inhumane laws on the Afghan people.124 Women were barred from schooling
and had to be accompanied by a husband or male family member whenever they left the home.125 Those accused of crimes were publicly stoned,
hanged, or subjected to amputation.126
At the same time, the Taliban offered shelter to Islamist extremist
groups who were being pursued by other states and multinational organizations.127 One group, al-Qaeda, was particularly fierce in its nationalist,
pro-Islamic state beliefs.128 The group believed that Afghanistan’s inability to establish a state based on Islam was directly attributable to external
powers.129 Al-Qaeda fought against the Soviets during the civil war, and
with the Taliban in power, they turned their focus toward America and its
Western allies, whose interests in the state were thwarting al-Qaeda’s
mission.130
When al-Qaeda bombed two American embassies in Africa, President
Clinton ordered missile strikes against their training camps in Afghanistan.131 The United States also demanded that the Taliban give Osama bin
123. See NOJUMI, supra note 122, at 118 (illustrating that Taliban, a group of religious students,
established an administration and military campaign in Qandahar and surrounding provinces); see
also Ghufran, supra note 122, at 462 (“The Taliban emerged in Afghanistan’s political scene with
the avowed objective of ending the civil war and bringing peace to the country.”).
124. See A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan, supra note 105 (“The Taliban outlaw[ed] cultivation of poppies for the opium trade, crack[ed] down on crime, and curtail[ed] the education and
employment of women. Women [were] required to be fully veiled and [were] not allowed outside
alone. Islamic law [was] enforced via public executions and amputations.”).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Parkin, supra note 105 (describing international outrage at Taliban policies that erased
women’s rights, punished dissenters brutally, and harbored Islamist extremists); see also Bruce
Riedel, The Taliban Affirm Their Alliance with Al-Qaida: Afghan Peace Talks in Doubt,
BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/08/20/the-taliban-affirm-their-alliance-with-al-qaida-afghan-peace-talks-in-doubt/
[https://perma.cc/BXB8RY4S] (“The Afghan Taliban never publicly broke with al-Qaida after 9/11, but they rarely mentioned their decades-old partnership. . . . Al-Qaida in contrast always reaffirmed its loyalty to the
Taliban, which had harbored it before and after 9/11. Without the Taliban safe haven before 9/11,
the attacks would never have occurred; al-Qaida needed its Afghan sanctuary.”).
128. Osama bin Laden and other Islamists formed the group al-Qaeda (or “the base”). A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan, supra note 105. They waged jihad against Soviets and other foreigners whom they saw as the only obstacle to establishing an Islamic state. Id. Believing that their
jihad was responsible for the Soviets’ faltering stance in Afghanistan, they turned their offensive
focus toward the United States. Id.
129. See sources cited supra note 128 and accompanying text.
130. A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan, supra note 105.
131. Id.;
At 10:30 a.m. local time, a massive truck bomb explodes outside the U.S. embassy in
Nairobi, Kenya. Minutes later, another truck bomb detonated outside the U.S. embassy
in Dar es Salaam, the capital of neighboring Tanzania. The dual terrorist attacks killed
224 people, including 12 Americans, and wounded more than 4,500. The United States
accused Saudi exile Osama bin Laden, a proponent of international terrorism against
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Laden—the leader of al-Qaeda—over to American authorities to be tried
for the embassy bombings.132 The Taliban refused and continued to harbor the group within Afghanistan’s borders.133
Three years later, bin Laden and his followers committed the 9/11 terror attacks on the World Trade Center, killing thousands of American
civilians and hundreds of first responders. One week after the attacks,
President Bush signed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force,
giving him broad authority to invade Afghanistan as part of the War on
Terror.134 U.S. and British forces began launching airstrikes on Afghan
land, specifically targeting Taliban bases and regions occupied by alQaeda.135 Within three months, the Taliban weakened immensely, and
the group was forced to surrender its final strongholds in Afghanistan.136
Hamid Karzai, a supporter of Western-backed politics and foreign policy, was sworn in as interim president of the new Afghan government.137
Karzai was elected leader in June of 2002, and again in October 2004.138
U.S. and other Western forces aided Karzai in implementing a democratic
government and helped train Afghan military forces to protect the nation’s sovereignty from groups like the Taliban and al-Qaeda.139 During
America, of masterminding the bombings. On August 20, President Bill Clinton ordered
cruise missiles launched against bin Laden’s terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and
against a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, where bin Laden allegedly made or distributed
chemical weapons.
U.S. Embassies in East Africa Bombed, HIST. (Aug. 4, 2021), https://www.history.com/this-dayin-history/u-s-embassies-in-east-africa-bombed [https://perma.cc/VG2A-BHDR].
132. The United States demanded that bin Laden be extradited for the embassy bombings, but
the Taliban declined. Later, the UN punished Afghanistan with sanctions, restricting trade and economic development in the process. See A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan, supra note 105.
133. See sources cited supra note 132 and accompanying text.
134. AUMF, supra note 6; see also The U.S. War in Afghanistan, supra note 86 (“This joint
resolution will later be cited by the Bush administration as legal rationale for its decision to take
sweeping measures to combat terrorism, from invading Afghanistan, to eavesdropping on U.S. citizens without a court order, to standing up the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”).
135. The U.S. War in Afghanistan, supra note 86.
136. See Alissa J. Rubin, Did the War in Afghanistan Have to Happen?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/23/world/middleeast/afghanistan-taliban-deal-unitedstates.html [https://perma.cc/ULJ2-6GDB] (describing American forces’ quick takeover of Kabul).
137. See A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan, supra note 105 (“Hamid Karzai, a royalist and
ethnic Pashtun, [in December 2001 was] sworn in as the leader of the interim government in Afghanistan. Karzai entered Afghanistan after living in exile for years in neighboring Pakistan. At the
U.N.-sponsored conference to determine an interim government, Karzai already ha[d] the support
of the United States and by the end of the conference [was] elected leader of the six-month government.”).
138. Hamid Karzai, COLUM. UNIV. (Sept. 25, 2003), https://worldleaders.columbia.edu/directory/hamid-karzai [https://perma.cc/KFV5-7GV3].
139. Then-Senator Joe Biden explained his view of the United States’ interest in supporting
Karzai and maintaining an American military presence:
The long-term solution is to rebuild Afghanistan’s army and police force—but that can’t
happen overnight. In the meantime—at least a year, and probably longer—there are only
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this time, however, the Taliban moved into the mountainous regions of
Afghanistan.140 As the years passed, the group gained strength, leading to
increasingly hostile outbursts of violence, with NATO-backed forces
eventually intervening to restore the peace.141
By 2009, the Taliban had gained considerable strength, leading President Obama to send 17,000 more U.S. troops to the region.142 On May 2,
2011, U.S. Navy Seals executed Osama bin Laden.143 Afghan officials
became increasingly concerned with U.S. presence in the nation and
asked the military to begin backing out.144 The Afghan army also began
a slow takeover of operations from NATO-backed forces.145 Though
three alternatives: Use American troops as peacekeepers. Build up a robust international
force. Or let Afghanistan revert to chaos. U.S. forces seem to be involved in de facto
peacekeeping right now. Wouldn’t it be better to clarify the mission, and let our allies
share the burden? Afghan leader Hamid Karzai, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan,
and nearly every expert on the region has called for expansion of the U.N.-mandated
security force, ISAF, both in scope and tenure. In my view, this is clearly in our national
interest. We should view ISAF as a force-multiplier. Without U.S. or U.N. peacekeepers,
we’re left with the third option: letting Afghanistan degenerate into the state of lawlessness that made way for the Taliban. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, America turned
its back as the country disintegrated. President Bush has rightly promised not to repeat
this mistake. If we fail to uphold the President’s promise, Afghanistan will again become
a den of terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and exporters of violent insurgency.
Afghanistan: Building Stability, Avoiding Chaos: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rels.,
107th Cong. 2 (2002) (statement of Joseph R. Biden, Chairman, S. Comm. on Foreign Rels.); see
also CLAYTON THOMAS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46879, U.S. MILITARY WITHDRAWAL AND
TALIBAN TAKEOVER IN AFGHANISTAN: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 3 (2021) (“The creation
of the new Afghan government also represented the beginning of a major new mission set for U.S.
forces and their international partners: helping defend and develop that government and its nascent
military.”).
140. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELS., 111TH CONG., TORA BORA REVISITED: HOW
WE FAILED TO GET BIN LADEN AND WHY IT MATTERS TODAY 1 (Comm. Print 2009) (reporting
that by early December 2001, al-Qaeda fled to Tora Bora, a complex region of caves and tunnels
in dangerous terrain).
141. Parkin, supra note 105; see also A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan, supra note 105
(“Amid increased violence, NATO [took] over security in Kabul in August [2003]. The effort [was]
the security organization’s first-ever commitment outside of Europe.”).
142. Helene Cooper, Putting Stamp on Afghan War, Obama Will Send 17,000 Troops, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 17, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/washington/18web-troops.html
[https://perma.cc/2FEY-7W5U].
143. Kris Osborn & Ho Lin, The Operation That Took Out Osama Bin Laden, MILITARY,
https://www.military.com/history/osama-bin-laden-operation-neptune-spear (last visited Sept. 21,
2021) [https://perma.cc/QJ5J-BDEM] (“[O]n May 2, 2011, during which SEAL Team Six secretly
descended upon a compound in Pakistan, blew down doors and engaged enemy combatants. The
goal: kill or capture terrorist leader Osama bin Laden. . . . With its successful completion, the operation ended the life of the man regarded as the mastermind behind the terror attacks of September
11, 2001, which claimed thousands of lives.”).
144. See A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan, supra note 105 (showing that President Karzai
wanted American forces out of Afghan villages after a U.S. soldier killed sixteen Afghan civilians
inside their homes).
145. Id.; see also NATO and Afghanistan, N. ATL. TREATY ORG. (Dec. 7, 2021, 2:18 PM),
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm
[https://perma.cc/F4H7-6KU5]
(“[The
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NATO ended its mission in 2014, Obama rejected his initial plan to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan, leaving roughly 5,000 troops in the
country by the end of his second term.146 By 2016, only 1,000 troops remained to staff Kabul’s security office.147
President Trump did little in this area during the first three years of his
term, but in early 2020, he signed an unexpected peace agreement with
the Taliban.148 The agreement had four goals:
1) To prevent armed groups from using Afghanistan as a base for acts
against the United States and its allies;
2) To withdraw foreign forces, including US troops, contractors, and
coalition forces, from Afghanistan;
3) To schedule intra-Afghan negotiations for March 10, 2020; and
4) To discuss within intra-Afghan negotiations the implementation of
a permanent and comprehensive cease-fire and a political roadmap for
Afghanistan’s future.149
The agreement kickstarted the U.S. withdrawal process from Afghanistan, with full withdrawal scheduled for May 2021.150 But at the time of
the peace deal, the Taliban had already retaken nearly half of the country,
with relentless suicide bomb attacks almost daily.151 An agreement was
NATO-led mission] was completed in December 2014 when the Afghan National Defence and
Security Forces assumed full responsibility for security across their country.”).
146. See Julie Pace, Obama Says U.S. “Finishing the Job” in Afghanistan, PBS NEWSHOUR
(May 27, 2014, 2:48 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/obama-expected-announceplan-keep-9800-u-s-troops-afghanistan [https://perma.cc/8XD7-TJT9] (“Over the course of [2014–
2015], the number of troops would be cut in half [from 9,800] and consolidated in the capital of
Kabul and at Bagram Air Field, the main U.S. base in Afghanistan.”).
147. Id.
148. Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan Between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
Which Is Not Recognized by the United States as a State and Is Known as the Taliban and the
United States of America, U.S.-Taliban, Feb. 29, 2020, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf [hereinafter Doha
Agreement]; see also Ctr. for Preventive Action, What to Know About the Afghan Peace Negotiations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Sep. 11, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/article/whatknow-about-afghan-peace-negotiations [https://perma.cc/Z5NQ-3QUU] (explaining that the USTaliban agreement was signed by U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation
Zalmay Khalilzad and the Taliban’s Political Deputy and Head of the Political Office Mullah Abdul
Ghani Baradar on February 29, 2020, in Doha, Qatar).
149. The explanation of the Agreement’s goals can be found at Ctr. for Preventative Action,
supra note 148; see also Doha Agreement, supra note 148, at 1 (outlining agreement’s goals).
150. Doha Agreement, supra note 148, at 2; see also A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan,
supra note 105.
151. See U.S. Dep’t of Def., Lead Inspector Gen., Operation Freedom’s Sentinel Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2020–March 31, 2020 (May 19, 2020) (“Although
U.S. and Taliban representatives signed an agreement on February 29 as a first step toward ending
the conflict, a number of events occurred that raised questions over whether the peace process
would take place. Taliban violence continued at high levels . . . . [I]ncreas[ing] attacks against the
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces during this period. The Taliban escalated violence
further after signing the agreement.”). See also Ctr. for Preventative Action, supra note 148 (“Taliban attacks increased across the country following the signing of the agreement and it remains to
be seen whether and how the United States will respond.”).
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reached between Afghan government officials and the Taliban, who
planned a cease-fire deal and a slow-acting U.S. withdrawal process.152
In exchange for withdrawal, the Taliban agreed not to harbor, aid, encourage, or protect international terrorist groups on Afghan soil.153
With this backdrop, intra-Afghan talks were set to negotiate a formalized government transition.154 However, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani
refused to negotiate unless the Taliban met his conditions, the main one
being that the Taliban give up support for all terrorist organizations, not
just al-Qaeda.155 Furthermore, the agreed-upon cease-fire had no specific
start date, leading the Taliban to continue its attacks on the Afghan government, with U.S. forces conducting air strikes in response.156
Finally, in September 2020, the intra-Afghan discussions began.157
The Taliban urged an Islamic state and called for a government based on
religious principles.158 In contrast, Afghan officials pushed for a ceasefire, pleading for the attacks to end and for civil society to rebuild.159 By
November, talks between the two groups had reached a deadlock, but the

152. See Ctr. for Preventative Action, supra note 148 (demonstrating that despite short observance of cease-fires since agreement was signed, the Taliban resumed its military campaign
against Afghan security forces); see also The U.S. War in Afghanistan, supra note 86 (explaining
that both sides expressed eagerness to bring peace and establish an Afghan society after U.S. withdrawal, with the government specifically pushing for a cease-fire).
153. See THOMAS, supra note 139, at 6–7 (“[T]he Taliban committed to prevent any groups,
including Al Qaeda, from threatening the United States or its allies by not allowing those groups to
reside, train, or fundraise in Afghanistan.”).
154. See id., at 7 (“Per the [Doha] agreement, intra-Afghan negotiations were also to begin [in
March 2020], but talks remained unscheduled for months amid political gridlock in Kabul . . . .”).
155. Afghan Govt, Like Taliban, Has Conditions for Peace Talks: Ghani, TOLONEWS TV
NETWORK (Mar. 30, 2020), https://tolonews.com/afghanistan/afghan-govt-taliban-has-conditionspeace-talks-ghani?utm_source=dailybrief&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DailyBrief2020
Mar3&utm_term=DailyNewsBrief [https://perma.cc/V4UF-HVTD] (explaining that President
Ghani was frustrated with Taliban’s unwillingness to cut ties with other terrorist organizations in
region).
156. See The U.S. War in Afghanistan, supra note 86 (“The U.S.-Taliban deal [didn’t] call for
an immediate cease-fire, and in the days after its signing, Taliban fighters carr[ied] out dozens of
attacks on Afghan security forces. U.S. forces respond[ed] with an air strike against the Taliban in
the southern province of Helmand.”).
157. Id.; see generally CLAYTON THOMAS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IN11502, INTRA-AFGHAN
TALKS COMMENCE IN DOHA, QATAR (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/download/IN/IN11502/IN11502.pdf/ [https://perma.cc/T5MZ-PM65].
158. THOMAS, supra note 157, at 3; see also Mujib Mashal, Afghanistan Peace Talks Open in
Qatar, Seeking End to Decades of War, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/12/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban.html [https://perma.cc/7P7C-Z85Z] (“We
seek an Afghanistan that is independent, sovereign, united, developed and free—an Afghanistan
with an Islamic system in which all people of the nation can participate without discrimination and
live harmoniously with each other in an atmosphere of brotherhood.” (quoting Taliban deputy
leader in negotiations Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar)).
159. THOMAS, supra note 157, at 3; see also Mashal, supra note 158 (“Members of [the Afghan
government] said their priority was to get to a lasting cease-fire . . . .”).
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Trump administration still announced its intent to pursue withdrawal.160
The international community began to voice its concern for the withdrawal plan, fearing that a hollow state—if intra-Afghan peace talks
broke down—could allow terrorist groups to retake the region easily.161
Nevertheless, President Biden continued Trump’s withdrawal trajectory,
with slight modifications.162 Though the original agreement with the Taliban set full withdrawal for May 1, Biden released a plan for a September
11 deadline.163 Whether the intra-Afghan talks continued or not, Biden
announced that “[i]t’s time to end America’s longest war.”164
But the withdrawal process started on bad footing. On July 5, 2021,
U.S. forces left Bagram Airfield, the largest American military base in
Afghanistan, without informing the base’s new Afghan commander,

160. The U.S. War in Afghanistan, supra note 86; see David Zucchino & Thomas GibbonsNeff, What to Know About the Afghan Peace Talks, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/01/world/asia/afghanistan-peace-talks.html [https://perma.cc/6BSJ-SL4S] (explaining that peace talks resumed in January 2021 after having stalled in late 2020).
161. See Ned Temko, Ignored in Afghanistan Pullout, NATO Allies Fear “America First”,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 25, 2021), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/2021/0825/
Ignored-in-Afghanistan-pullout-NATO-allies-fear-America-First [https://perma.cc/DX3C-7Y7N]
The core reason for [U.S. allies’] concern is that a war launched and prosecuted for two
decades alongside America’s partners in the transatlantic NATO alliance was ended in
a matter of weeks—by a unilateral U.S. decision, on a unilateral U.S. timetable, with
little consultation and virtually no meaningful input from the allies.
See also Steven Erlanger, Afghan Fiasco Raises Hard Questions for Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/23/world/europe/afghanistan-europe-nato-biden.html
[https://perma.cc/5W9G-WZFD]
Officials from Britain, Germany, Italy and France have complained that despite Mr.
Biden’s promises of consultation, there has been more diktat than conversation on Afghanistan. . . . Josep Borrell Fontelles, the E.U. foreign affairs chief, told the European
Parliament that the departure was “a catastrophe for the Afghan people, for Western
values and credibility and for the developing of international relations.”
162. Remarks by President Biden on the Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, WHITE
HOUSE BRIEFING ROOM (July 8, 2021, 2:09 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/speeches-remarks/2021/07/08/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-drawdown-of-u-s-forcesin-afghanistan/ [https://perma.cc/JBB3-B2ME]; see also Erlanger, supra note 161 (explaining that
Biden administration rejected allies’ demands for a “conditions-based withdrawal,” and insisted
instead on a firm withdrawal deadline).
163. See Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, WHITE HOUSE
BRIEFING ROOM (Apr. 14, 2021, 2:29 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speechesremarks/2021/04/14/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-way-forward-in-afghanistan/
[https://perma.cc/X3XC-UC2D] (“U.S. troops, as well as forces deployed by our NATO Allies and
operational partners, will be out of Afghanistan before we mark the 20th anniversary of that heinous
attack on September 11th.”); see also Alana Wise, Jason Breslow & Jaclyn Diaz, “It’s Time to End
This Forever War.” Biden Says Forces to Leave Afghanistan by 9/11, NPR (Apr. 15, 2021, 3:57
AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/04/14/986955659/biden-to-announce-he-will-end-americas-longest-war-in-afghanistan [https://perma.cc/P7RN-XQCD] (“Biden outlined a drawdown that will
begin May 1 and conclude by Sept. 11, but he said it would not be a ‘hasty rush to the exit.’ The
U.S. will leave Afghanistan ‘responsibly, deliberately and safely,’ he said.”).
164. Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, supra note 163.
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General Mir Asadullah Kohistani.165 On August 6, the Taliban took control of their first province, Nimroz, despite the conditions on their agreement with the United States.166 Following control of Nimroz, the Taliban
gained immense strength as Afghan forces laid down their arms.167 The
Taliban took over all other provinces in Afghanistan, finally reaching the
capital city, Kabul, on August 15.168 Admidst the chaos, thousands of
American citizens, diplomats, and other government workers were hastily evacuated from the city by helicopter and military plane.169
The Biden administration did not anticipate the Taliban’s plan to take
over Kabul’s international airport.170 The State Department had originally
163. See Kathy Gannon, U.S. Left Afghan Airfield at Night, Didn’t Tell New Commander, PBS
NEWSHOUR (July 5, 2021, 3:44 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/u-s-left-afghan-airfield-at-night-I-tell-new-commander [https://perma.cc/N3PK-RPZK] (reporting that U.S. troops
left Bagram Airfield by shutting off electricity and slipping away at night without notifying base’s
new Afghan commander, who discovered the departure two hours after they left).
166. Eugene Kiely & Robert Farley, Timeline of U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan,
FACTCHECK.ORG (Aug. 17, 2021), https://www.factcheck.org/2021/08/timeline-of-u-s-withdrawal-from-afghanistan/ [https://perma.cc/UC4C-TG7B].
167. See Tom Bowman & Monika Evstatieva, The Afghan Army Collapsed in Days. Here Are
the
Reasons
Why,
NPR
(Aug.
20,
2021,
4:04
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/08/20/1029451594/the-afghan-army-collapsed-in-days-here-are-thereasons-why [https://perma.cc/NYA8-CBW8] (arguing that lack of trust in Afghan government,
coupled with other issues like poverty, corruption, and poor education, played role in Afghan
army’s willingness to let Taliban sweep the country); see also Anatol Lieven, Opinion, Why Afghan
Forces So Quickly Laid Down Their Arms, POLITICO (Aug. 16, 2021, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/08/16/afghanistan-history-taliban-collapse-504977
[https://perma.cc/H6PR-P6UK] (“That the U.S. government could not foresee—or, perhaps, refused to admit—that beleaguered Afghan forces would continue a long-standing practice of cutting
deals with the Taliban illustrates precisely the same naivete with which America has prosecuted
the Afghanistan war for years.”).
168. Ahmad Seir et al., Taliban Sweep into Afghan Capital After Government Collapses,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 15, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-kabulbagram-e1ed33fe0c665ee67ba132c51b8e32a5 [https://perma.cc/URE3-JZEH].
169. See Robert Burns, Matthew Lee & Ellen Knickmeyer, US Sending 3K Troops for Partial
Afghan Embassy Evacuation, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 12, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-us-troops-embassy-kabul-355c48ec08fb7eb75e1e279e99c3dabf
[https://perma.cc/5W8V-QMGX] (explaining that troops’ evacuation would limit embassy’s ability
to conduct normal operations); see also Raju Gopalakrishnan, Alasdair Pal & Cynthia Osterman,
Taliban Enter Afghan Capital as U.S. Diplomats Evacuate by Chopper, REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2021,
4:53 AM), https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-troops-arrive-afghan-capital-assistevacuations-2021-08-14/ [https://perma.cc/WB9Z-68DK] (“U.S. officials said the diplomats were
being ferried to the airport from the embassy . . . . ‘Core’ U.S. team members were working from
the Kabul airport, a U.S. official said, while a NATO official said several EU staff had moved to a
safer, undisclosed location in the capital.”).
170. See Mark Mazzetti, Julian E. Barnes & Adam Goldman, Intelligence Warned of Afghan
Military Collapse, Despite Biden’s Assurances, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/17/us/politics/afghanistan-biden-administration.html [https://perma.cc/2PSXGYGP] (reporting that Biden administration made its withdrawal decisions before July, believing
Afghan government could hold out for as long as two years); see also Zeke Miller, Jonathan Lemire
& Josh Boak, Biden Team Surprised by Rapid Taliban Gains in Afghanistan, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Aug. 15, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-afghanistan-taliban-5934ef05b0094d01
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intended to keep 1,400 embassy employees in Afghanistan, protected by
650 Marines and soldiers.171 But when the Taliban surrounded the civilian airport, it became crucial to evacuate as many Americans as possible.172 President Ghani also fled Afghanistan as soon as Kabul fell to the
Taliban.173
Part of America’s miscalculation laid with the Biden administration’s
assuredness that there was time to withdraw and evacuate at a slow pace,
allowing the Afghan military to take over operations gradually.174 Biden
frequently stated that if the Taliban were to take over, it would take one
or two years for them to make considerable gains.175 The administration
was also overconfident in the abilities of the Afghan military, assuring
89b5d900d2380179 [https://perma.cc/4GZS-EY6Q] (“‘We’ve seen that that force has been unable
to defend the country, and that has happened more quickly than we anticipated,’ Secretary of State
Antony Blinken told CNN, referring to the Afghan military.”).
171. Michael D. Shear et al., Miscue After Miscue, U.S. Exit Plan Unravels, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
31, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/21/us/politics/biden-taliban-afghanistan-kabul.html
[https://perma.cc/6XKH-2GNG]; see also Vanessa Romo, U.S. Is Starting to Evacuate Some Embassy Staff from Afghanistan with Military Help, NPR (Aug. 12, 2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/08/12/1027175876/u-s-embassy-kabul-evacuate-staff-afghanistan-military [https://perma.cc/2T5Q-DEHT]
The U.S. is evacuating a “significant” number of employees from its embassy in Kabul,
Afghanistan, as Taliban forces gain ground across the country. The State Department
announced . . . it is reducing its civilian footprint of roughly 4,000 personnel to a “core
diplomatic presence” given the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan.
172.
[The homeland security advisor] called for flying most of the embassy personnel out of
the compound, and many out of the country, while a small core group of diplomats operated from a backup site at the airport. . . . By Wednesday, Aug. 11, the Taliban advances were so alarming that Mr. Biden asked his top national security advisers in the
White House Situation Room if it was time to send the Marines to Kabul and to evacuate
the embassy.
Shear et al., supra note 171.
173. See Natasha Turak & Amanda Macias, Ousted Afghan President Ashraf Ghani Resurfaces
in UAE After Fleeing Kabul, Emirati Government Says, CNBC (Aug. 18, 2021, 2:31 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/18/afghan-president-ashraf-ghani-is-in-uae-after-fleeing-afghanistan.html [https://perma.cc/UC3J-JZ5H] (clarifying that President Ghani left Afghanistan with no
announcement or clear reporting on where he was going, remarking that he fled to prevent bloodshed at the palace).
174. See Nomaan Merchant & Zeke Miller, Misread Warnings Helped Lead to Chaotic Afghan
Evacuation, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 18, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-evacuations-32bb6a22846f649b626a3130f8c5dffb [https://perma.cc/J8TL-FETW] (“A defense estimate
that Kabul could be surrounded within 30 days—an assessment that was viewed as pessimistic
when it was reported last week—turned out instead to be far too optimistic. In just over a week, the
Taliban overran the country and entered Kabul without a fight.”); see also Shear et al., supra note
171 (explaining that Biden administration officials believed they had ample time).
175. See Shear et al., supra note 171 (“An intelligence assessment presented at [a State Department and White House official meeting] estimated that Afghan forces could hold off the Taliban
for one to two years.”); see also Remarks by President Biden on the Drawdown of U.S. Forces in
Afghanistan, supra note 162 (“[T]he likelihood there’s going to be one unified government in Afghanistan controlling the whole country is highly unlikely. . . . [T]he likelihood there’s going to be
the Taliban overrunning everything and owning the whole country is highly unlikely.”).
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Americans that these forces had been adequately trained under U.S.
forces and were prepared to take on Taliban resistance.176 They were
wrong on both counts.
It took the Taliban less than a month to overtake all of Afghanistan’s
provinces and the capital city.177 Much of their success was due to the
Afghan military’s willingness to lay down arms.178 The Biden administration leaned on this fact considerably, blaming the Afghan military’s surrender mentality from the outset.179 But Americans had trained the
176. See Craig Whitlock, Unguarded Nation, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-army-police/
[https://perma.cc/VS76-TE9C] (“With [U.S., NATO, and Afghan officials] speaking on the assumption that their remarks would remain private, they depicted the Afghan security forces as incompetent, unmotivated, poorly trained, corrupt and riddled with deserters and infiltrators.”); see
also Interview of Dr. Thomas Johnson, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction,
obtained
by
WASH.
POST
12–13
(Jan.
7,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/documents-database/?document=johnson_thomas_ll_01072016 [https://perma.cc/CQX9-2J8L] (“[T]he Afghan national police . . . is still the most hated institution[] in [] Afghanistan because they’re an extractive
organization, and you know, they take.”).
177. See Seir et al., supra note 168 (“In a stunning rout, the Taliban seized nearly all of Afghanistan in just over a week, despite the billions of dollars spent by the U.S. and NATO over nearly 20
years to build up Afghan security forces.”); see also Christina Goldbaum et al., Kabul Falls to the
Taliban as the Afghan Government Collapses and the President Flees, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/08/15/world/taliban-afghanistan-news
[https://perma.cc/KM9M-DPJD] (“In a lightning offensive, the Taliban swallowed dozens of cities
in a matter of days, leaving Kabul as the last major redoubt of government control.”).
178. See Max Boot, How the Afghan Army Collapsed Under the Taliban’s Pressure, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELS. (Aug. 16, 2021, 4:45 PM), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-afghan-army-collapsed-under-talibans-pressure?gclid=CjwKCAjw-sqKBhBjE-wAVaQ9a7UTrrNNMWv1yTgLq
6bqw6L68m1sX3toMCWSZFQI8dPwIykyObzqJRoC28MQAvD_BwE [https://perma.cc/H8Q5XT49] (“Quite simply, an Afghan military that over the past twenty years had learned to rely on
U.S. support for airpower, intelligence, logistics, planning, and other vital enablers was fatally demoralized by the U.S. decision to abandon it.”); see also Bowman & Evstatieva, supra note 167
(“The Taliban fought with an ideological fervor and to rid the country of the foreign invaders,
values enshrined in Afghan identity. ‘It animated the Taliban. It sapped the will of Afghan soldiers
and police. When they clashed, Taliban were more willing to kill and be killed than soldiers and
police’ . . . .”); cf. Whitlock, supra note 176 (showing that Afghan elders believed Afghan military
forces were there to sell weapons and fuel, not to defend Afghan people and fight Taliban).
179. See Sami Sadat, Opinion, I Commanded Afghan Troops This Year. We Were Betrayed.,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/25/opinion/afghanistan-talibanarmy.html [https://perma.cc/3PW4-BYAB]
It pains me to see Mr. Biden and Western officials are blaming the Afghan Army for
collapsing without mentioning the underlying reasons that happened. Political divisions
in Kabul and Washington strangled the army and limited our ability to do our jobs. Losing combat logistical support that the United States had provided for years crippled us,
as did a lack of clear guidance from U.S. and Afghan leadership.
See also Steve Holland & Nandita Bose, Biden Defends Afghanistan Decision, Blames Afghan
Army’s Unwillingness to Fight, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2021, 9:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
world/us/biden-says-us-mission-afghanistan-was-never-supposed-be-nation-building-2021-08-16/
[https://perma.cc/Y82T-WVTV] (illustrating that Biden blamed Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan
on political leaders who fled and unwillingness of Afghan army to fight); Alex Thompson & Christopher Cadelago, Biden Tries to Shift Blame on Afghanistan, POLITICO (Aug. 31, 2021, 7:47 PM),
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Afghan military, provided them with arms and technology to carry out
operations and monetary support to continue developing.180 A host of reasons likely influenced the Afghans’ choice not to fight: fear, corruption,
unpreparedness, or fatigue.181
American withdrawal from Afghanistan also created a devastating humanitarian crisis.182 Scores of Afghan citizens frantically stormed the international airport, desperately trying to fly their families to safety.183
Mothers begged U.S. officials to take their children; one infant was even
hoisted over a fence to an American soldier.184 Afghan men clung to the
wings of American military planes as they took off, some falling to their
deaths as the planes took to the air.185
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/08/31/biden-blame-afghanistan-508204
[https://perma.cc/A3XW-V9Q7] (“Biden’s remarks served as the latest instance of the president
digging his heels in on Afghanistan in the face of an unprecedented wave of criticism from traditional allies in the Democratic Party and the media.”).
180. See Whitlock, supra note 176 (“Since 2002, the United States has allocated more than $83
billion in security assistance to Afghanistan, a sum that dwarfs the defense budgets of other developing nations. In 2011, at the peak of the war, Afghanistan received $11 billion in security aid from
Washington . . . .”).
181. See sources cited supra notes 176, 178 and accompanying text.
182. See Filippo Grandi, After the Airlift, UNHCR (Aug. 30, 2021), https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2021/8/612c87444/airlift-news-comment-attributable-un-high-commissionerrefugees-filippo.html [https://perma.cc/PM4K-7MKF] (arguing that because some Afghans needed
to seek safety across borders, borders must be open so they can exercise their right to seek international protection); see also Abigail Ng, As U.S. Troops Leave Afghanistan, A “Far Greater” Humanitarian Crisis Is Just Starting, UN Warns, CNBC (Aug. 31, 2021, 2:48 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/31/afghanistan-faces-great-humanitarian-crisis-as-foreign-troopsleave-un.html [https://perma.cc/QF3N-5UV8] (“[H]alf the country is in need of aid, and half the
children are malnourished after ‘decades of conflict and drought.’ The population is ‘very vulnerable’ and does not have access to food, water, education and health care . . . .”).
183. Carlotta Gall & Ruhullah Khapalwak, Chaos Ensues at Kabul Airport as Americans Abandon Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/16/
world/asia/afghanistan-airport-evacuation-us-withdrawal.html [https://perma.cc/P4G9-V4Y8]; see
also Yaroslav Trofimov, Dion Nissenbaum & Margherita Stancati, “Saigon on Steroids”: The Desperate Rush to Flee Afghanistan, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2021, 7:59 PM), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/saigon-on-steroids-the-desperate-rush-to-flee-afghanistan-11629071999 [https://per
ma.cc/9R7Q-CY3H] (“Afghanistan was falling and hundreds of civilians struggled to get on board
the few remaining planes waiting to carry people to safety. Afghan security forces and several
dozen U.S. Marines rushed through the military terminal to secure the tarmac. A warning boomed
in Pashto: ‘Please go back, please go back.’”).
184.
[T]he mass of outstretched hands produced a baby, no more than a few months old, and
held the child up for the soldiers to see. As if handling a piece of luggage, a Marine
plucked the infant by a single arm, passing the child behind him before turning back to
the crowd. The scene is harrowing to watch, which is precisely why a video of it was
quickly transmitted around the world, fueling anger at a haphazard evacuation process.
Katie Rogers, A Baby Passed Over a Wall in Kabul Is Reunited With His Family, the Military Says,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/20/world/asia/afghanistan-kabulbaby.html [https://perma.cc/5A88-JEX6].
185.
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The United States completed its withdrawal on August 30, 2021—a
day earlier than expected.186 But the second week of withdrawal was particularly violent, with an ISIS-K attack outside the Kabul airport killing
thirteen U.S. service members and dozens of Afghan citizens.187 The final
military cargo airplane left the international airport on August 30, after
having flown more than 120,000 people out of the nation over the twoweek withdrawal period.188 Around 200 Americans were still seeking
evacuation from Afghanistan at that time.189
At the conclusion of the American evacuation process, many Afghan
translators who risked their lives for U.S. military forces could not get
seats on any planes.190 Military officers expressed dismay at their
In one extraordinary scene filmed by Afghan media, hundreds of people ran alongside
an American military C-17 cargo plane and some tried to climb into the wheel wells or
cling to the sides of the plane as it gathered speed, a striking symbol of America’s military might flying away even as Afghans hung on against all hope. An American military
official confirmed that some Afghans were killed, either crushed by the plane on takeoff
or falling to their deaths.
Gall & Khapalwak, supra note 183.
186. Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby and General Kenneth F.McKenzie Jr. Hold a
Press Briefing, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Aug. 30, 2021), https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2759183/pentagon-press-secretary-john-f-kirby-and-general-kenneth-fmckenzie-jr-hold-a/ [https://perma.cc/ZAX4-44TK]. General McKenzie described the withdrawal’s end:
The last C-17 lifted off from Hamid Karzai International Airport this afternoon at 3:29
p.m. East Coast time and the last manner aircraft is now clearing the airspace above
Afghanistan. . . . Tonight’s withdrawal signifies both the end of the military component
of the evacuation but also the end of the nearly 20-year mission that began in Afghanistan
shortly after September 11th, 2001.
Id. See also Amanda Macias, U.S. Ends 20-Year War in Afghanistan with Final Evacuation Flights
Out of Kabul, CNBC (Aug. 31, 2021, 6:52 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/30/afghanistanupdate-last-us-troops-leave-kabul-ending-evacuation.html
[https://perma.cc/PP6S-WXUE]
(“America’s longest war is over. The United States finished its withdrawal efforts from the airport
in Kabul, Afghanistan, the Pentagon said Monday [August 30], effectively ending a two-decade
conflict . . . .”).
187. Statement by President Joe Biden on the Evacuation Mission in Kabul, WHITE HOUSE
BRIEFING ROOM (Aug. 28, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/28/statement-by-president-joe-biden-on-the-evacuation-mission-in-kabul/
[https://perma.cc/8FDR-GWG4]; Yuliya Talmazan et al., 13 U.S. Service Members, Dozens of Afghans Killed in Kabul Airport Bombings, NBC NEWS (Aug. 27, 2021, 5:16 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/high-threat-terror-attack-disrupts-kabul-airport-evacuations-biden-deadline-n1277670 [https://perma.cc/RWR2-N38K].
188. See Statement by President Joe Biden, WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING ROOM (Aug. 30, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/30/statement-by-president-joe-biden/ [https://perma.cc/BUK6-LCHS] (“The past 17 days have seen our troops execute
the largest airlift in US history, evacuating over 120,000 US citizens, citizens of our allies, and
Afghan allies of the United States.”); see also Macias, supra note 186 (“About 122,800 people have
been evacuated since the end of July, including about 6,000 U.S. citizens and their families.”).
189. Macias, supra note 184.
190. David Rohde, Biden’s Chaotic Withdrawal From Afghanistan Is Complete, THE NEW
YORKER (Aug. 30, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/bidens-chaotic-
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inability to help those who had risked so much for their units over the
twenty-year war.191 Overall, at least 200,000 Afghans who had worked in
some capacity for U.S. forces were left behind in Afghanistan, facing retaliation from the Taliban government.192
B. Constitutional Analysis
Before returning to the situation in Afghanistan, understanding the
scope of congressional war and treaty powers requires a focus on early
Supreme Court cases at the dawn of America’s nationhood. Under Chief
Justice Marshall, the Court analyzed, decoded, and clarified the smallest
details of the U.S. Constitution, providing an important backdrop into
constitutional separation of powers.
1. Congressional War Powers
At the dawn of the new republic, war powers were already muddied.
Before the Constitution was ratified, Congress had generally approved
military operations of nationalized state militias, authorizing the president to “protect border areas.”193 But the first major debates on war powers did not arise until the “Quasi-War” with France from 1798 to 1800.194
America never declared war, but the conflict still raised issues of unilateral presidential actions that provoked French military response.195
Some Americans viewed the Quasi-War as unconstitutional because it
lacked a formal declaration.196 President Adams, however, later went to
Congress to obtain support, especially because the young nation was still

withdrawal-from-afghanistan-is-complete [https://perma.cc/JBA5-R2HC] (describing plight of
thousands of Afghans with connections to U.S. military and diplomatic missions unable to leave
when Americans left Kabul).
191. See id. (“I am empathetic to the people I’ve put in this position . . . Where is the moral
courage?” (quoting a U.S. colonel who struggled to help his interpreters)).
192. Lauren Leatherby & Larry Buchanan, At Least 250,000 Afghans Who Worked With U.S.
Haven’t Been Evacuated, Estimates Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/08/25/world/asia/afghanistan-evacuations-estimates.html
[https://perma.cc/J8XK-8VNL]; Rohde, supra note 190.
193. Stephen M. Griffin & Matthew C. Waxman, War Powers: Congress, the President, and
the Courts—A Model Casebook Section 3 (Tul. Pub. L. Rsch. Working Paper No. 20-18 & Colum.
Pub. L. Rsch. Working Paper No. 14-669, Jan. 12, 2021).
194. Id.; The Quasi-War With France (1798–1800), USS CONST. MUSEUM, https://ussconstitutionmuseum.org/major-events/the-quasi-war-with-france/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/VAN2-Z6Y5].
195. Kat Eschner, This Unremembered US-France “Quasi-War” Shaped Early America’s Foreign Relations, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (July 7, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smartnews/unremembered-us-france-quasi-war-shaped-early-americas-foreign-relations-180963862/
[https://perma.cc/769F-3DVL].
196. Griffin & Waxman, supra note 191, at 3.
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lacking in military funds and power.197 Therefore, some Adams supporters saw this as close coordination between the branches, with Congress
ultimately controlling hostilities and authorizing them through its constitutional authority.198
The Supreme Court decided Bas v. Tingy in 1800, a case concerning
war powers.199 During the limited war with France, an American ship recaptured another American merchant vessel from a French private.200
During that time, two statutes regulated the value of property that could
be salvaged by a recaptor.201 The first statute stated that only one-eighth
of the value was allowed, but the second statute stated that a recaptor was
entitled to half of the value.202 The relevant statute to be applied depended
on whether France was considered an “enemy” under the law.203 Neither
the United States nor France had declared war, but Congress had approved hostile actions against the French.204 The Court held that Congress
ultimately had the power to determine the scope and means of executing
war, and the Court would interpret Congress’s intent regarding whether
a nation was considered an enemy for purposes of legal disputes. 205
In 1801, the Court further defined Congress’s power in times of war in
Talbot v. Seeman.206 In Talbot, a Hamburg citizen’s ship was recaptured
from the French by the United States.207 In determining whether the captain of the U.S. vessel could salvage the value of the ship, the Court stated

197. See id. (“President Adams could only proceed with the war by consulting with Congress
to obtain its support. Adams had to carefully design his plans and submit them to Congress partly
because the U.S. did not yet have a navy. . . . Adams thus had to have Congress’s legislative backing.”); see also Gregory E. Fehlings, America’s First Limited War, 53 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLL.
REV. 101, 111 (2000) (explaining that in the Quasi-War, Congress never declared war because
President never requested it, setting precedent for future conflicts).
198. Griffin & Waxman, supra note 193, at 3.
199. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 37 (1800).
200. Id. at 37.
201.
[T]he plaintiff in error contends, that the compensation should be regulated by the act of
the 28th June 1798, (4 vol. p. 154. s. 2.) which allows only one-eighth for salvage; while
the defendant in error refers his claim to the act of the 2d March, (ibid. 456. s. 7.) which
makes an allowance of one-half, upon a re-capture from the enemy, after an adverse
possession of ninety-six hours.
Id. at 40 (Washington, J.).
202. Id.
203. Id. (questioning whether, at the time of the ship’s recapture, the government considered
America at war with France).
204. See id. at 41 (Washington, J.) (“[I]t is said, that a war of the imperfect kind, is more
properly called acts of hostility, or reprizal [sic], and that congress did not mean to consider the
hostility subsisting between France and the United States, as constituting a state of war.”).
205. Id. at 39 (Moore, J.); id. at 41 (Washington, J.); id. at 43 (Chase, J.); id. at 45 (Paterson,
J.).
206. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 1 (1801).
207. Id. at 2. Hamburg, a sovereign city at the time, was neutral to the U.S.-France conflict. Id.
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that “the acts of [C]ongress are to be inspected.”208
Chief Justice Marshall concluded that, under various acts of Congress
governing the conflict, the U.S. captain had reason to believe that he
could capture the ship from the French.209 Regarding the value of the ship,
no Congress had spoken on that issue; therefore, it was governed by common law principles.210 But Chief Justice Marshall did not address any
orders from the president; he analyzed the right to capture the ship solely
on congressional acts.211
The first time that a conflict arose between the war powers of the president and Congress came in Little v. Barreme.212 In Little, Congress authorized seizure of American ships bound for French ports, but remained
silent on any other circumstances of seizure during hostilities with the
French.213 The president’s approach to seizure was more liberal.214 Captain Little then seized a Danish ship heading from France to Denmark,
thus violating the congressional statute.215
The Marshall Court held the seizure unlawful but did not determine
whether Congress initially had the power to enact the statute, nor did the
Court clearly articulate the President’s war powers.216 But many scholars
agreed that while Chief Justice Marshall referred to the president’s right
to “take care” that the congressional statute is employed, it did not imply
that the president would have the authority to independently create a similar policy.217 Therefore, Marshall asserted that the scope of a captain’s
actions is limited by a congressional act, notwithstanding a president’s
order.218
208. Id. at 29.
209. Id. at 31–33.
210. Id. at 33–34.
211. See generally id.
212. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 170 (1804).
213. Id. at 170 (recounting stipulations of Non-Intercourse Act of 1799).
214. The president had instructed the Secretary of the Navy to stop ships suspected to be American and travelling to French ports, even if the ship’s ownership and destination were unknown. Id.
at 177–78.
215. Id. at 176.
216. See Dehn, supra note 4, at 619 (pointing to Chief Justice Marshall’s lack of opinion on
Congress’s substantive or restrictive-implementing measures with a conflicting order from the
President).
217. See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 255 (2007)
(stating that Marshall ignored the issue of presidential acts without authorization); see also David
J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional
History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 969 (2008) (believing that Marshall supported presidential power
to enact orders in the absence of any congressional statute, but that the president could not contradict a congressional enactment).
218. See Michael J. Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power: Little v.
Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 5, 9–10 (1988) (“Marshall’s understanding of
congressional intent thus sets a stage for direct confrontation between the executive and legislative
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Other important early war powers cases included Murray v. The
Schooner Charming Betsy219 and United States v. Brown,220 which both
reinforced the Court’s earlier applications of Congress’s war powers.221
Still, Chief Justice Marshall refrained from drawing any conclusions
about the separation of powers between the president and Congress during times of war.222 These cases suggest an early understanding that the
legislative branch retained the authority to regulate the nature and scope
of war. Furthermore, the executive power fell under this “umbrella” of
congressional authorization: the commander in chief only had the power
to act within the terms laid out by Congress.
2. Congressional Treaty Powers
For a war to “officially” end, a peace agreement must be signed and
ratified by all relevant hostile nations.223 But with the increase of executive control over war powers, executive agreements became the mode of
choice for many presidents in ending armed conflict.224 The Constitution
does not explicitly mention executive agreements, but these agreements
are seen as an extension of the president’s power under the Take-Care
branches over foreign affairs, and on that stage he unfolds the central meaning of his decision, and
the proposition that gives it an abiding timeliness: The will of Congress controls.”); see also Jane
Manners, Executive Power and the Rule of Law in the Marshall Court: A Rereading of Little v.
Barreme and Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1941, 1944–45 (2021)
(explaining that the Marshall Court understood that the Constitution gave Congress sole law-making and war-making powers, with executive orders without effect on the scope of those powers).
219. The Charming Betsy, a Danish ship, was recaptured from French nationals by an American
captain. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 115–16 (1804). The captain
was acting pursuant to a statute that prohibited commerce between France and the United States,
but because the ship was Danish, the Court held the seizure illegal. Id. at 118, 120–21. The Court
reasoned that ambiguous congressional statutes should be construed so as to be in harmony with
international law. Id. at 118; see Dehn, supra note 4, at 622 (“[The Charming Betsy case] strongly
implies that only Congress can dictate the scope and means of hostilities in which the United States
will engage.”).
220. Here, the Supreme Court held that a congressional declaration of war did not allow the
president to seize enemy property without an express authorization. See Brown v. United States,
12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 125–29 (1814) (finding that seizing and condemning property of enemy
nationals was improper without congressional authorization).
221. See sources cited supra notes 219, 220 and accompanying text.
222. See Dehn supra note 4, at 624 (expanding on Marshall’s reluctance to consider a separation-of-powers issue).
223. Understanding Peace Treaties, A.B.A. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/publications/teaching-legal-docs/understanding-peace-treaties/ [https://perma.cc/WE52-XAW8].
224. See Jeffrey S. Peake, The Decline of Treaties? Obama, Trump, and the Politics of International Agreements 40 tbl. I (Apr. 6, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3153840_code1321157.pdf?abstractid=3153840&miri
d=1&type=2 [https://perma.cc/U7JR-6K6K] (showing treaties and executive agreements enacted
during each presidential term since President Truman); see Oona A. Hathaway, Curtis A. Bradley
& Jack L. Goldsmith, The Failed Transparency Regime for Executive Agreements: An Empirical
and Normative Analysis, 134 HARV. L. REV. 629, 632 (arguing that executive agreements have
been primary choice for presidents in making international commitments).
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Clause.225
There are two types of executive agreements: (1) sole-executive agreements and (2) congressional-executive agreements.226 The former is usually rare: the president acts entirely on his own and no congressional authorization is needed.227 The prevailing theory is that the president has
the power to implement this type of agreement under his Article II foreign-affairs powers.228 But there is no clear consensus on what those foreign-affairs powers entail.229 Sole-executive agreements can be made
pursuant to Article II powers alone, but the president typically shares
powers with other branches under the federalist system.230
Congressional-executive agreements are more common and are made
pursuant to a statutory grant of power to the president by Congress.231 If
there is no statutory grant, then congressional-executive agreements require subsequent congressional approval.232
The origins of the executive’s foreign-affairs powers lay in United

225. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The president] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”); see also sources cited supra notes 223, 224 and accompanying text.
226. See Legal Basis for Executive Agreements, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-2/section-2/clause-3/legal-basis-for-executive-agreements (last
visited June 4, 2022) (describing various types of executive agreements related to peace keeping in
hostile nations).
227. See David Sloss, International Agreements and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1963, 1966 (2002) (“[T]he President has a limited power to create binding international obligations by means of sole executive agreements, but the President cannot create binding
domestic law by means of sole executive agreements.”); see also Anne. E. Nelson, From Muddled
to Medellín: A Legal History of Sole Executive Agreements, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1035, 1038 (2009)
(asserting that early federalist position narrowly defined purpose and use of sole-executive agreements).
228. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1957, at 207–17
(1957) (discussing president’s Article II powers to enact foreign policy); Sharon G. Hyman, Note,
Executive Agreements: Beyond Constitutional Limits?, 11 ARIZ. L. REV. 805, 823 (1983) (explaining that a sole-executive agreement is a necessary part of president’s ability to direct foreign affairs
under the Constitution).
229. For a discussion of relevant sole-executive agreements with significant foreign policy consequences, see Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, 66 FOREIGN AFFS. 284, 294–
95 (1987).
230. Legal Basis for Executive Agreements, supra note 226; cf. Hyman, supra note 228, at 807
(“As a tool used to implement the nation’s foreign policy decisions, the international agreement
lies at the center of any discussion of the constitutional division of power with respect to foreign
affairs. . . . Our constitutional system of checks and balances under the doctrine of separation of
powers requires that policymaking not be concentrated solely in one branch of the federal government.”).
231. Legal Basis for Executive Agreements, supra note 226.
232. Id.
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States v. Curtiss-Wright,233 and specifically United States v. Belmont,234
in cases of international agreements that are made absent Senate approval. Though Belmont held that the president has the capability to commit the United States to foreign agreements, the Court stipulated that the
agreement must accompany either an independent Article II power of the
President or congressional acquiescence through statutory authority.235
But in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, congressional silence
was also viewed as acquiescence if Congress had a history of remaining
silent on the issue at hand.236 Justice Ginsburg dissented, arguing that the
president’s authority to convey agreements required a “more formal and
binding federal instrument.”237
The Garamendi decision was later narrowed by Medellín v. Texas,238
in which the Supreme Court held that the ability to incorporate non-selfexecuting treaties by the president to the states is prohibited absent any
congressional action.239 Silence was not seen as acquiescence in this case
due to the president’s “unprecedented action” in making a claims settlement, a resolution that was not supported by a longstanding history of
233.
Not only, as we have shown, is the federal power over external affairs in origin and
essential character different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the exercise of federal power is significantly limited In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power
to speak or listen as the representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice
and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate
cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.
299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). This case is cited as a principal authority on the president’s foreignaffairs power as speaker, listener, and “representative of the nation.” See Daniel A. Cotter, United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936), in CONSTITUTING AMERICA: A 90-DAY STUDY ON
THE HISTORY OF OUR COUNTRY’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 30, 32 (2017), http://constitutingamerica.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/90DayStudySupremeCourt2017-FINAL.pdf.
234. 301 U.S. 324 (1937). The Supreme Court upheld the president’s power to engage in international agreements outside the treaty process, trumping state law:
[T]he President recognized the Soviet Government, and normal diplomatic relations
were established between that government and the Government of the United States
. . . . That the negotiations . . . . were within the competence of the President may not
be doubted. Governmental power over internal affairs is distributed between the national
government and the several states. Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government. And in respect of what
was done here, the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of that government.
Id. at 330.
235. See Daniel Silverberg, The President as Lawmaker: Moderating Executive Authority in
Wartime, 5 AM. U. NAT’L SEC. L. BRIEF 37, 46–47 (2014) (stating that there had to be independent
presidential power under the Constitution, a clear history of congressional acquiescence, or an authorizing statute); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S.
Constitution, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 308 (2007) (arguing that unilateral executive authority contradicts constitutional process for making treaties).
236. 539 U.S. 396, 429 (2003).
237. Id. at 442 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
238. 552 U.S. 491, 491 (2008).
239. Id. at 526.
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congressional silence.240
According to some legal scholars, these cases articulate the Court’s
“middle ground” approach in times of war and national-security crises.241
This approach favors cooperative action between the legislative and executive branches, encouraging the executive to involve the legislature and
the legislature to proscribe bounds for the executive.242
IV. CONGRESSIONAL POWER: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Though the beginning of the war in Afghanistan started with almost
unanimous support from Congress, it increasingly became an unpopular
war as subsequent presidents continued their own foreign policy agendas
in the region. Eventually, Trump signed a sole-executive agreement with
the Taliban to begin a withdrawal process. The move surprised Congress,
and as Biden forged ahead with the timeline, he left congressmembers
out of the discussion completely.
The dire situation in Afghanistan—both during U.S. invasion and as
American forces left the country—could have been more orderly, efficient, and successful had Congress insisted on asserting its own war powers. Just as the war began with emotion-filled hysteria, it ended with a
desperate, and ultimately ineffective, effort to withdraw in a state of dignity. The insufficient preparation and inadequate management of the
withdrawal process allowed for human-rights considerations and safety
precautions to go unheeded.
In the beginning, Congress had strongly supported the invasion.243
Congress then allowed four presidents to unabashedly forge their own
foreign-policy path, involving American troops and money in anti-terror
efforts not only in Afghanistan, but across the world. Representative Lee
has tried on numerous occasions to repeal the AUMF since that initial
vote, but executive war powers have continued unchecked under the
AUMF to this day.244
This section introduces the various solutions at Congress’s disposal
240. Id. at 532.
241. See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and
Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 1 (2004).
242. Id.
243. AUMF, supra note 6. The AUMF passed by a unanimous vote in the Senate and a House
of Representatives vote of 420-to-1. Carlson, supra note 82.
244. Congresswoman Barbara Lee Continues Efforts to Stop Endless Wars, CONGRESSWOMAN
BARBARA LEE (Jan. 12, 2021), https://lee.house.gov/news/press-releases/congresswoman-barbaralee-continues-efforts-to-stop-endless-wars [https://perma.cc/Z995-NZWQ]; see also Joshua Keating, Barbara Lee’s Long War on the War on Terror, SLATE (Aug. 7, 2017, 5:50 AM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/08/barbara-lees-long-war-on-the-war-on-terror.html
[https://perma.cc/6RJS-JGTN] (stating that Rep. Lee sponsored many bills to overturn AUMF of
2001 in years that followed).
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that could have been utilized in Afghanistan, such as an update to the War
Powers Resolution, clearer funding guidelines, or regulation of foreign
aid and cooperation. Additionally, it explores how withdrawal from Afghanistan could have gone differently had these solutions been applied.
A. Solutions Under War Powers
Under Congress’s war powers, the legislature could have provided
clear withdrawal guidelines well in advance, rather than relying on multiple intelligence-agency reports that came to different conclusions only
weeks beforehand. (President Biden ultimately ignored most of these reports.)245
First, Congress could have drafted withdrawal guidelines by updating
the War Powers Resolution, requiring (1) clear evidence that withdrawal
is feasible from a logistical and humanitarian perspective and (2) congressional consultation before any withdrawal from U.S. military bases.
In relation to the withdrawal from Afghanistan, these requirements would
have forced the executive to produce concrete evidence that a withdrawal
process would not bring undue harm to Afghan citizens and would be
feasible within the scheduled timeline. Congress could have also required
congressional consultation before abandoning Bagram Airfield, ensuring
that Congress played an active role in the initial withdrawal procedure.
Had Biden consulted with Congress, there would have been a waiting
period allowing for communication with and notification to the Afghan
military of America’s exit from the airfield.246 Afghan forces would then
have had more time to prepare, thus ensuring the Afghan military had a
fighting chance against the Taliban.
Second, Congress could have allocated specific funding toward withdrawal procedures, allowing for a more robust contact-tracing process for
American citizens in Afghanistan, heightened evacuation resources, and
additional support for the State Department’s emergency visa program.247
Furthermore, the purse power could have included restrictions to induce
the withdrawal process, such as a cutoff of funds toward troop

245. See Mazzetti, Barnes & Goldman, supra note 170 (stating that intelligence reports had a
pessimistic view of Afghan military’s strength, but Biden argued that Afghan government was unlikely to fall, raising questions about why the Biden administration chose to ignore warning signs).
246. Gannon, supra note 165.
247. For information on the contact-tracing process, see Jack Detsch, Kelly Kimball & Robbie
Gramer, State Department: Thousands of U.S. Residents Still Stuck in Afghanistan, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Nov. 3, 2021, 3:37 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/03/state-department-afghanistan-usresidents/ [https://perma.cc/7FNJ-VVU5]. For information on the special immigrant visas, see Special Immigrant Visas for Afghans Who Were Employed by/on Behalf of the U.S. Government, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/immigrate/special-immg-visaafghans-employed-us-gov.html (last visited May 29, 2022) [https://perma.cc/G22S-2UX2].
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deployment or military-resource spending.248 This is a broad solution that
could still be formalized through new legislation or with an amendment
to the War Powers Resolution.
Finally, Congress could have insisted—through its war-power and legislative-oversight functions—that American intelligence and executive
agencies coordinate closely with multinational organizations like the UN,
and with U.S. allies present in Afghanistan, like NATO. A well-coordinated, streamlined communication system with the international community could have led to less global outrage, as well as a more cohesive,
organized, and humane evacuation process. While the president holds
foreign-affairs powers, Congress may direct funding toward security-related international activities, with a particular focus on military cooperation.249 Funding for foreign aid and international action could have ensured that NATO allies and other nations involved in defense from the
Taliban were prepared for the large-scale withdrawal effort. Additionally,
international resources and logistical solutions could have been provided
in the operation, allowing for a more robust and capable undertaking.
With these solutions, it is unlikely that U.S. forces would have left behind 200,000 Afghan allies in the evacuation process. Though Afghan
citizens still would have wanted their families out of the country, it is
unlikely that images of people clinging to military cargo planes and hoisting their children into the arms of soldiers would have been captured.
With proper funding and early action, humanitarian disaster could have
been avoided or at least mitigated.
B. Solutions Under Treaty Powers
Within the legislature’s treaty powers, Congress could have argued
that Trump’s peace deal with the Taliban was an unconstitutional soleexecutive agreement. This would have allowed Congress to intervene in
the Afghanistan withdrawal process as early as February 2020.
There are two possibilities to explain the Taliban peace deal’s legal
foundations. The first asserts that the Taliban peace agreement signed by
President Trump was a congressional-executive agreement based on the
AUMF of 2001. Under the AUMF, the president had the authority both
to use necessary force and to terminate that force by agreement.250
248. See generally Pub. L. 93-52, § 108, 87 Stat. 130, 134 (1973); see also Section III.B.1 supra
for a discussion on Congress’s purse powers in relation to armed conflict.
249. Toni Johnson, Congress and U.S. Foreign Policy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Jan. 24,
2013, 11:34 AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/congress-and-us-foreign-policy#chapter-title-0-4 [https://perma.cc/L4BM-5UC7]; see generally Norman J. Ornstein & Thomas E. Mann,
When Congress Checks Out, 85 FOREIGN AFFS. 67 (2006), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2006-11-01/when-congress-checks-out [https://perma.cc/37A3-M5YP].
250. AUMF, supra note 6.
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Therefore, by this rationale, the deal to end the War on Terror in Afghanistan was preemptively authorized by Congress when it passed the AUMF
twenty years ago.
The second—and more compelling—argument is that the Taliban
peace deal was an unconstitutional sole-executive agreement. The AUMF
did not directly acknowledge Congress’s stance on war-ending maneuvers or withdrawal processes.251 To argue that the president has an implied power to engage in unilateral war-ending measures without congressional authorization, based solely on the vague (and overly broad)
wording of the AUMF, goes beyond its statutory meaning. Therefore, the
Taliban agreement arguably lacked statutory authorization or subsequent
congressional approval as required by Belmont.252 Moreover, because
war powers are shared between the executive and legislative branches,
President Trump did not have the unilateral authority to broker this deal
without congressional authorization. War powers are not solely an Article
II power, and consequently, this sole-executive agreement was an unconstitutional violation of Congress’s war and treaty powers.
By arguing that the Taliban peace deal was an unconstitutional soleexecutive agreement, the legislative branch has multiple options to assert
its powers in withdrawal operations. First, Congress could require that
the executive branch publish the agreement with a note on the congressional statute authorizing the agreement. This would allow for more public oversight and could even place restraints on funding for any agreement
or entry into force until the note is published. Additionally, relevant congressional committees could also elect to publish the executive agreements and notes they receive, making demands of executive agencies for
specificity regarding legal authority in their actions.
Second, Congress could issue a resolution clarifying the AUMF’s statutory language and legislative intent. In relation to treaties and executive
agreements, this could include clearer language on how the president
communicates with legislators regarding any war-ending maneuvers, or
a stipulation reserving Congress’s right to approve or disapprove of any
executive agreement related to the statutory matter at hand.253
251. Id.
252. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (stipulating that an agreement
must accompany either an independent Article II power of the president or congressional acquiescence through statutory authority).
253. Congress is critical of the executive branch’s more significant foreign-policy decisions—
most of which lacked congressional consultation—such as the United States’s previous involvement in Vietnam. Therefore, a negative history, including the more recent withdrawal from Afghanistan, may compel Congress to adopt stricter statutory guidelines. See 121 CONG. REC. 11973
(1975) (statement of Senator Glenn); see also Eugene Lang, How Afghanistan Is—And Isn’t—Vietnam All Over Again, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 24, 2021, 10:32 AM),
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Third, a case like Dames & Moore v. Regan may reach the Court and
force a return to the case’s broad opinion.254 In Dames & Moore,255 the
Court recognized the president’s ability to enter into executive agreements without Senate approval if “such claims [were] integrally connected with normalizing United States relations with a foreign state.”256
But the bounds of that statement are purposefully vague and subject to
narrowing.257 Furthermore, the Court heavily relied on previous congressional sanctions of these types of agreements, recognizing that congressional approval, even if implicit, is still a major factor in authorizing a
president’s executive agreement.258 If a case arrives at the Court in which
it is argued that congressional authorization was not granted for the Taliban peace deal, the Court may have to reexamine its Dames opinion, potentially narrowing the language and meaning of “integrally connected.”
As Dames also suggests, silence from Congress does not equal acquiescence when it comes to unilateral executive action, particularly when

https://theconversation.com/how-afghanistan-is-and-isnt-vietnam-all-over-again-166455
[https://perma.cc/H88N-MMM2] (comparing the fall of Saigon and Kabul, both of which had chaotic evacuations, thousands of local civilians trying to board military aircraft, and a strong military
presence that lost the will to continue fighting after Americans left).
254. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 654 (1981).
255. Id. In Dames, the Supreme Court considered, among other issues, the president’s decision
to suspend all claims against Iran in the International Claims Tribunal in order to comply with an
executive agreement between the United States and Iran to release American hostages held in the
country. Id. at 660.
256. Id. at 683.
257. See Rebecca A. D’Arcy, Note, The Legacy of Dames & Moore v. Regan: The Twilight
Zone of Concurrent Authority Between the Executive and Congress and a Proposal for a Judicially
Manageable Nondelegation Doctrine, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 291, 300 (2003) (“The question
nonetheless remained as to what ‘species’ of power such executive orders constituted.”); see also
James D. Redwood, Dames & Moore v. Regan: Congressional Power over Foreign Affairs Held
Hostage by Executive Agreement with Iran, 15 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 249, 277 (1982) (“[T]he Dames
Court’s finding of congressional approval in the working of executive agreements, through inertia
and acquiescence, further adds to ‘[t]he murkiness of the judicial waters [and enables] the determined executive branch to accomplish what it otherwise might be unable to do . . . .’” (citing Morris
D. Forkosch, The United States Constitution and International Relations: Some Powers and Limitations Explored, 5 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 219, 269 (1975))).
258. See Dames, 453 U.S. at 680 (“Crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that Congress
has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement.”). In this case, the
Court relied on a history of congressional acquiescence in executive claims settlements, including
Congress’s enactment of the International Claims Settlement Act. Id. at 678–80. This Act created
a procedure for future settlement agreements, suggesting that Congress had preemptively approved
future executive actions in this area. See id. at 680 (“By creating a procedure to implement future
settlement agreements, Congress placed its stamp of approval on such agreements.”). Additionally,
Congress had acquiesced in previous executive claims settlements, including settlements with
China, East Germany, and Vietnam. Id. at 681. See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that the validity of a president’s action
hinges on multiple considerations, including congressional indifference or acquiescence).
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the action is not normally undertaken by the president.259 Here, it can be
argued that the president took an unprecedented action in signing a peace
deal with an internationally recognized terrorist organization, and therefore, silence from Congress in this matter does not suggest implicit approval of the agreement. Congress should not only assert its stance on the
Taliban peace deal, but also argue that future executive agreements with
foreign enemies require a similar level of congressional input to be binding.
V. TODAY’S SOLUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Indeed, Congress has already moved forward in pursuit of a stronger
position on both the legislature’s war powers and treaty powers. This section explores Congress’s actions and argues that early Supreme Court
cases support these actions. Congress’s current acts will be discussed in
turn.
A. Reasserting Congress’s War Authority
It is imperative that Congress reestablish its legislative authority to declare war under the Constitution. Over the past century, Congress increasingly abdicated its own decision-making powers to the executive, resulting in disastrous foreign-policy choices and costly wars. While
reestablishment of authority can be accomplished in a variety of ways,
the Senate has introduced one promising solution.
The National Security Powers Act, a bipartisan bill introduced by Senators Chris Murphy, Mike Lee, and Bernie Sanders, aims to “recalibrate[]
the balance of power, putting Congress on near-equal footing with the
Commander-in-Chief as the driver of Washington’s posture toward the
world.”260 The Act reviews reform of three areas: (1) war powers, (2)
arms exports, and (3) national emergencies.261 All three are governed by
congressional authorization, meaning that the president must obtain

259. See Dames, 453 U.S. at 686 (“Past practice does not, by itself, create power, but ‘longcontinued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the
[action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent . . . .” (citing United States v. Midwest Oil
Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915))); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531 (2008) (explaining that
when Congress has acquiesced in long-standing executive action, the president can presume congressional consent).
260. Andrew Desiderio, Unlikely Senate Alliance Aims to Claw Back Congress’ Foreign Policy
Powers “Before It’s Too Late”, POLITICO (July 20, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/20/bipartisan-senators-congress-war-powers-500214
[https://perma.cc/FN66-SJKJ].
261. National Security Powers Act, S. 2391, 117th Cong. (2021); SEN. CHRIS MURPHY,
NATIONAL SECURITY POWERS ACT ONE-PAGER (2021), https://www.murphy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/NSPA%20one%20pager.pdf [https://perma.cc/S56T-HNWW] [hereinafter NSPA ONEPAGER].
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Congress’s authorization through consultation.262
Regarding war-powers reform, the Act would automatically sunset
(i.e., repeal) any and all existing AUMFs, including the AUMF of 2001,
that granted immense powers to the executive branch under the umbrella
of fighting terror.263 The Act would also narrow the War Powers Resolution significantly.264 “Hostilities,” the notoriously vague term in the Resolution that allowed the executive branch to argue intervention as a police
action rather than an armed conflict, would be defined to include “any
situation involving any use of lethal or potentially lethal force by or
against United States forces . . . .”265 Additionally, the sixty-day limit on
hostilities not authorized by Congress would lower to a twenty-day limit,
making it significantly harder for a president to begin armed conflict that
is not short-term in nature.266 Finally, Congress’s purse power would automatically cut off funding if a president failed to seek or obtain authorization from Congress.267 Under the Resolution, Congress is required to
seek a veto-proof majority to terminate funding, but under the Act, funding cuts would become automatic.268
The National Security Powers Act is a good start for Congress to claw
back its war powers. Still, more action to ensure that the executive branch
is limited in its abilities to conduct any type of invasion or intervention
without congressional authorization—through a language update of the
War Powers Resolution, a designation of specific funding toward withdrawal procedures, or coordination with multinational organizations—is
suggested.269 Overall, repealing the AUMF of 2001 and upgrading the
War Powers Resolution would provide an avenue for Congress to reassert
its constitutional powers and deal equally with the executive branch.270
Early case law on war powers supports the constitutionality of the National Security Powers Act. The Supreme Court was clear in its assertion
that Congress held the role as primary overseer of armed conflict, from
its declaration to its conclusion.271 Though the president takes care to execute the laws, he is still subject to the legislature’s statutory
262. See NSPA ONE-PAGER, supra note 261, at 1 (“In each case, the president is required to
consult congressional leaders and obtain congressional authorization before exercising the powers
in question.”).
263. National Security Powers Act, § 103; NSPA ONE-PAGER, supra note 261, at 1.
264. National Security Powers Act, § 103; NSPA ONE-PAGER, supra note 261, at 1.
265. National Security Powers Act, § 101(2).
266. National Security Powers Act, § 106(c); NSPA ONE-PAGER, supra note 261, at 1.
267. National Security Powers Act, § 108; NSPA ONE-PAGER, supra note 261, at 1.
268. National Security Powers Act, § 108; NSPA ONE-PAGER, supra note 261, at 1.
269. See generally discussion supra Section IV.A.
270. See Desiderio, supra note 260 (“[The bill] aims to reverse the decades-long erosion of the
House and Senate’s authority to shape American foreign policy.”).
271. See generally discussion supra Section III.B and cases cited therein.
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limitations.272 Creating structural guidelines, funding procedures, and international cooperation techniques as it relates to war are well within
Congress’s powers. No case law currently suggests that Congress is unable to enact these procedures.273 Moreover, these limitations do not infringe on the president’s ability to command the armed forces as he sees
fit.274 The nature, mode, method, and means of combat still fall within the
president’s control.
B. The Legal Argument for Additional Treaty Powers
Congress should also assert that the Constitution grants the legislative
branch powers to regulate the “back end” of hostilities, or the withdrawal
process. Congress can use its treaty powers to advocate for this position.
If Congress has any hope of maintaining a more powerful position in
relation to the president at a war’s conclusion, lawmakers should require
executive briefs on the legal authority for entering into a treaty with a
foreign nation. Congress should also revisit its statutory language regarding treaty powers, requiring clearer communication between the executive and legislative branches. Most importantly, a legal challenge of the
Taliban peace deal may cause the Court to reconsider its vague language
under Dames, asserting that sole-executive agreements to end armed conflict are unconstitutional.275
Congress has so far failed to take any of these actions, but these various
solutions should be contemplated by the legislative branch in the future,
especially if and when the United States enters another armed conflict.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congressional war powers have withered not only due to expansive,
unilateral executive action, but also from Congress’s own decisions to rid
itself of power in the War on Terror. The lesson to be gleaned from Afghanistan is that the president’s authority in times of war has allowed for
ill-advised, temperamental interventions and floundering withdrawals. If
the U.S. government has any desire to improve its foreign-policy standing
around the world, Congress must reaffirm its constitutional war powers
alongside the executive branch and reassert its logistical role in war-ending agreements.
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See generally Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170, 170 (1804).
See generally discussion supra Section III.B and cases cited therein.
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